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ABSTRACT

In the future, a growing number of combat operations will
be carried out by autonomous weapon systems (AWS). At the
operational level, AWS would not rely on direct human input.
Taking humans out of the loop will raise questions of the
compatibility of AWS with the fundamental requirements of
internationalhumanitarianlaw (IHL), such as the principlesof
distinction and proportionality,as well as complicate allocation
of responsibilityfor war crimes and crimes against humanity.
This Article addresses the development toward greater
autonomy in military technology along three dimensions: legal,
ethical, and political concerns. First, it analyzes the potential
dehumanizing effect of AWS with respect to the principles of
distinction and proportionalityand criminal responsibility.
Second, this Article explores, from an ethical perspective,
the advantages and disadvantages of the deployment of AWS
independent of legal considerations.Authors from various fields
have weighed in on this debate, but oftentimes without linking
their discourse to legal questions. This Article fills this gap by
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bridging these disparatediscourses and suggests that there are
important ethical reasons that militate against the use of AWS.
Third, this Article argues that the introduction of AWS
alters the risk calculus of whether to engage in or prolong an
armed conflict. This alteration is likely to make that decision
politically more palatable and less risky for the political
decision makers.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In a seminal article in 2000, Theodor Meron, the former
President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, expressed his hope that the direction of international
humanitarian law could undergo a development toward conducting
combat in a more humane fashion.' This assessment was based on
the inroads that were made-maybe only apparently-in the
aftermath of the human rights tragedies in Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia. Particularly, Meron's hope was based on the installation
of international criminal tribunals in the 1990s. Since the publication

1.
See generally Theodor Meron, The Humanization of HumanitarianLaw, 94
AM. J. INT'L L. 239 (2000).
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of Meron's article, numerous new conflicts have broken out. The
assumptions underlying warfare have been put into question. The
face of modern conflict has undergone considerable change, best
evidenced by the rise of "asymmetric warfare." 2
The technology used in armed conflict has developed
significantly, increasingly allowing certain types of combat operations
to be carried out from a distance. This is certainly true for the muchdebated use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly referred
to as drones. UAVs have taken on a variety of roles in the military:
their use ranges from carrying out reconnaissance missions, to
carrying out armed attacks.3 The operators for these missions are
very often located thousands of miles away and conduct these
missions via remote control. 4 Militaries around the world use or
develop these capabilities not only with respect to UAVs, but also
with respect to sea and land warfare. Regardless of whether such
systems operate in the air or outer space, at sea, or on the ground,
current versions of unmanned systems (UMS) share one
characteristic: they operate with direct human input and human
operators make the very large majority of tactical decisions.
More fundamental changes are underway with the current
generation of UAVs, and these changes represent a stepping-stone
toward higher degrees of autonomy. A recent report by the U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD) specifically states that "the level of
autonomy should continue to progress from today's fairly high level of
human control/intervention to a high level of autonomous tactical
behavior that enables more timely and informed human oversight."5
This means that, unlike current systems that operate in an
automated manner, future systems will not only follow predetermined routes or hit a pre-programmed target, but will also
operate in a manner that allows the systems to select and acquire a

See Steven Metz, Strategic Asymmetry, MIL. REV., July-Aug. 2001, at 23,
2.
24 (explaining widely adopted definitions of asymetric warfare); see also DEP'T OF DEF.,
REPORT OF THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW § II (1997) (discussing asymmetric
means and challenges); Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., The Revenge of the Melians:
Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR (McNair Paper No. 62, 2000) (providing an indepth history and definition of asymmetric warfare).
3.
See P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR 36-37 (2009) [hereinafter SINGER,
WIRED].
See infra notes 26-31 for a more detailed description of the current use of
4.
UAVs.
5.
DEP'T OF DEF., FY 2009-2034 UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP
27 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter FY 2009-2034 UNMANNED SYSTEMS]. For a report giving
UMS a more independent role, but mindful of the potential consequences of letting
UMS make lethal decisions, see UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT PLAN 2009-2047 41 (2009) [hereinafter USAF
FLIGHT PLAN 2009-2047], available at http://www.govexec.com/pdfs/072309kpl.pdf
[http://perma.cc/HT7M-ESFP] (archived Sept. 22, 2014) ("Authorizing a machine to
make lethal combat decisions is contingent upon political and military leaders
resolving legal and ethical questions.").
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target, choose a route to reach the target area, decide whether to
deploy weapons, and, if so, decide which weapon system to deploy. 6
Thus, AWS 7 are designed to carry out missions with considerably less
human input than is the case today.
If and when these technological developments will come to
fruition is a matter of debate among technologists and experts from
other fields, and is crucial to this Article. There are several reasons
supporting the prediction that autonomy will increase in a number of
areas beyond the military realm, in such disparate fields as
transportation, logistics, medicine, as well as the care of children and
the elderly. Factors enabling the development of autonomous systems
include the establishment of an industry devoted to conducting
research and development, a push by investors within this industry,
and a proliferation of ideas for how to put autonomous systems to
use.8 This will likely be an incremental development, rather than a
sudden appearance of AWS in tomorrow's battle space.9 Whether it is
"inevitable and relatively imminent"10 remains to be seen.

6.
See FY 2009-2034 UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note
5, at 33-37.
7.
AWS are sometimes referred to, inter alia, as "lethal autonomous robotics"
or "killer robots." See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH,
FRAMING DISCUSSIONS ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF INCREASINGLY AUTONOMOUS
TECHNOLOGIES 3 (2014), available at http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/framingdiscussions-on-the-weaponization-of-increasingly-autonomous-technologies-en-606.pdf [http://
perma.cc/MMR3-FFM2] (archived Sept. 22, 2014) ("An initial hurdle to constructive
dialogue on autonomy in weapon systems is that different assessments are made by
different States, producers and experts as to where a specific technology sits on the
autonomy spectrum. This is compounded by uncertainty surrounding how the object
under consideration is labelled: 'drones', 'robots', autonomous weapon systems', 'killer
robots', 'lethal autonomous robotics', lethal and non-lethal' semi- and fully autonomous
weapons systems, 'supervised autonomy' and other terms."). Technically speaking, the
term "systems with autonomous capabilities" is the more apt term, as one can envision
weapon systems in which not all elements are acting autonomously.
8.
See Rise of the Robots, ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 2014, at 13, available at
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21599762-prepare-robot-invasion-it-will-changeway-people-think-about-technology-rise [http://perma.cc/4BCR-TSKJ] (archived Sept.
27, 2014).
9.
This type of development is not at all surprising, given that similar
technology in the civilian realm is moving in a similar direction. See John Markoff, A
Trip in a Self-Driving Car Now Seems Routine, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2014,
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/13/a-trip-in-a-self-driving-car-now-seems-routine/
?_php=true&_type=blogs&jr=0 [http://perma.cclV284-REJD] (archived Sept. 22, 2014);
see also Kenneth Anderson & Matthew C. Waxman, Law and Ethics for Robot Soldiers,
POL'Y REV. 2-4 (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract-id=2046375 [http://perma.cc/F9DL-3WQHI (archived Sept. 22, 2014) (making
similar arguments regarding military technology). But see Noel E. Sharkey, The
Evitability of Autonomous Robot Warfare, 94 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 787, 788-90, 797
(2012) [hereinafter Sharkey, Evitability] (describing the widespread use of destructive
autonomous battlefield robots as relatively imminent).
10.
Gary E. Marchant et al., InternationalGovernance of Autonomous Military
Robots, 12 COLUM. SCl. & TECH. L. REV. 272, 276 (2011).
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These developments have the potential to change the
assumptions on which IHL is based and alter fundamentally the
perceptions of armed conflict." Part II of this Article retraces the
development toward AWS and differentiates future generations of
AWS from systems that are currently deployed. Part III analyzes the
compatibility of AWS with some fundamental principles of IHL,
namely the principle of distinction, the principle of proportionality,
and personal responsibility. Part III then argues from a legal
perspective that, given current technology, AWS could be employed in
only a very narrow set of situations Parts. IV and V provide context to
12
and political' 3
the legal consideration and deal with the ethical
ramifications of the deployment of AWS, respectively. Through
widespread use of AWS, personal responsibility may be diluted to the
point that deterrent effects-with respect to not only individual
decisions over a particular mission but also the decision whether to
engage in armed conflict-may be significantly reduced. Part VI
contains concluding observations and recommends that fully
autonomous systems not be deployed until the country developing a
particular system has ascertained that the legal requirements under
international law have been met and that the ethical and political
issues have been satisfactorily answered in ways that would
generally be supported by the international community.

II. THE ROAD TO AND DEGREES OF AUTONOMY

A. HistoricalDevelopment
The end of the nineteenth century saw the first efforts to develop
UMS. Among the first to develop UMS was Nikola Tesla, who
patented and built the first remotely operated boat capable of
carrying an ordinance.' 4 Tesla's invention was ahead of its time by
15
Subsequent
almost a century and was never put into service.

Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, International HumanitarianLaw and the
11.
Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, 31LC/11/5.1.2 (Oct. 2011), available at
http://www.rcreconference.org/docs_uplen/31IC-IHL challenges-report._EN.pdf [http://
perma.cclRMQ5-9UUP] (archived Sept. 22, 2014). For a brief discussion on the use of
international humanitarian law as opposed to alternative terminology such as law of
war or law of armed conflict, see infra note 73 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.
12.
See infra Part V.
13.
1, 1898), available at
U.S. Patent No. 613,809 (filed July
14.
http://patimgl.uspto.gov/.piw?docid=00613809&SectionNum=l&IDKey=CC2FDFC0AE
[http://perma.cc/
A9&HomeUrl=http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect2=PTO1
NK9R-5GPZ] (archived Sept. 27, 2014).
See LAURENCE R. NEWCOME, UNMANNED AvIATION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
15.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 13-14 (2004) ("Calling it a 'telautomaton,' Tesla
promoted it as a new form of torpedo. Its implications were lost on the military and
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developments included the so-called Kettering Bug, a pilotless
biplane that was capable of carrying explosives and was developed in
the aftermath of World War 116 and Goliath, a cable-operated tracked
vehicle carrying an explosive ordinance that was deployed by the
German military in WW II." It became clear at the time that UMS
would be developed for more widespread use in future combat
operations. According to U.S. Army Air Corps General Henry "Hap"
Arnold, while World War II was characterized by "heroes flying
around in planes," future combat operations "may be fought by
airplanes with no men in them at all."' 8
Arnold's vision would not come to fruition for another half
century. In the interim, innovations such as the Global Positioning
System (GPS) in the area of telecommunication made possible the
development of devices that are operated from increasing distances.
This led to the development and subsequent widespread use of
UMS-first as airborne vehicles, followed by land-based and naval
devices.' 9 The modern incarnations of UAVs were first used in
combat operations in the 1980s. During operations in Lebanon's
Bekaa Valley in 1982, the Israel Defense Forces deployed UAVs in
two distinct roles: for intelligence purposes, and for use as decoys. 20
press attendees at the exposition, who dismissed it as a trick of no protactical
judgment.").
16.
See LT. KENDRA L.B. COOK, THE SILENT FORCE MULTIPLIER: THE HISTORY
AND ROLE OF UAVS IN WARFARE 2 (2007), available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/
stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=4161584&userType=inst. [http://perma.ce/ZZ27-GMNL]
(archived Sept. 22, 2014) (discussing the contract between Charles Kettering and the
United States Army for development of an unmanned aircraft). Because of reliability
issues, the Kettering Bug too was never deployed in combat. Id. (reporting that its
longest successful flight was only sixteen miles); see also John DeGaspari, Look, Ma,
No Pilot!, 125 MECHANICAL ENGINEERING, no. 11, Nov. 2003, at 42 (suggesting that
although the "bug" was never deployed in combat, it spurred interest in UAVs);
NEWCOME, supra note 15, at 29 (providing a lengthy flight history of the bug); DIANA G.
CORNELISSE, SPLENDID VISION, UNSWERVING PURPOSE: DEVELOPING AIR POWER FOR
THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE DURING THE FIRST CENTURY OF POWERED FLIGHT 22
(Helen Kavanaugh-Jones ed., 2002) (noting that the unreliability of the bug was
particularly concerning when flying over Allied troops).
17.
See Jon Guttman, Goliath Tracked Mine, 28 MIL. HISTORY, no. 2, July 2011,
at 23 (recounting the Goliath's initial production in Spring 1942). Setting off the
explosive destroyed the vehicle and because of its short range and slow speed, it was
not widely used. It nevertheless served as the precursor of more modern incarnations of
radio-controlled vehicles. See P.W. Singer, Drones Don't Die, 28 MIL. HISTORY, July
2011, at 66, 67 [hereinafter Singer, Drones] (noting that the effectivness of the Goliath
"was limited . .. by its low speed, poor ground clearance and vulnerability to smallarms fire").
18.
Lawrence Spinetta, The Rise of Unmanned Aircraft, AVIATION HISTORY,
Nov. 10, 2010, availableat http://www.historynet.com/the-rise-of-unmanned-aircraft.htm
[http://perma.cc/EN5V-B8XH] (archived Sept. 22, 2014).
19.
Id. (recounting the fast progression of innovative developments in UMS
deployed by the military).
20.
See Ralph Sanders, An Israeli Military Innovation: UAVs, 33 JOINT FORCE
Q. 114, 115 (2003) (detailing how UAVs gathered the electronic frequencies of radars
and subsequently emitted dummy signals in battlespace); ELIZABETH BONE &
CHRISTOPHER C. BOLKCOM, UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 2
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The use of UAVs accelerated after 1990 and has risen since then.
This is true with respect to the absolute number of UAVs in
operation, the level of expenditures, the number of combat operations
carried out by UAVs, and the number of countries using, developing,
or acquiring them. According to one source, the number of UAVs that
the U.S. has in operation has risen from 167 in 2002 to over 7,000 in
2012.21 The expenditures for UAVs by the U.S. military alone have
also risen sharply in roughly the same time frame. Expenditures for
UAV procurement and development amounted to $667 million in
2001 and rose to $3.9 billion in 2012.22 There is little doubt that this
figure will continue to increase in the future, given the apparent
proclivity of lawmakers to expand the use of unmanned systems. In
2000, Congress set forth that "[i]t shall be a goal of the Armed Forces
to achieve the fielding of unmanned, remotely controlled technology
such that-(1) by 2010, one-third of the aircraft in the operational
deep strike force aircraft fleet are unmanned; and (2) by 2015, one23
third of the operational ground combat vehicles are unmanned."
While those targets will not be met, particularly for ground combat
vehicles, there has been substantial progress towards those
objectives. In a similar fashion, countries around the world are slated
to increase their expenditures for UAVs from $6 billion to more than
$11 billion by 2020.24
The use of UAVs in combat situations has increased over the
years as well. While the first generation of UAVs was used for
intelligence purposes, newer iterations of UAVs now regularly fly
(2004) (noting how the traditional roles of reconnaissance and surveillance have been
greatly expanded).
Thomas J. Billitteri, Drone Warfare, 20 CQ RESEARCHER, no. 28, Aug. 2010,
21.
at 653, 656 ("In recent years the U.S. military has spent billions of dollars to expand its
fleet of unmanned planes, which has gone from 167 aircraft in 2002 to more than 7,000

now."); see JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. UNMANNED AERIAL

SYSTEMS 2 (2012) ("DOD's unmanned aircraft inventory increased more than 40-fold
from 2002 to 2010."). For an overview of the legal and policy questions surrounding
UAVs, see generally Brendan Gogarty & Meredith Hagger, The Laws of Man over
Vehicles Unmanned: The Legal Response to Robotic Revolution on Sea, Land and Air,
19 J.L., INF. & Scl. 73 (2008).

GERTLER, supra note 21 ("The FY2001 investment in UAS was
22.
approximately $667 million. For FY2012, DOD has asked for $3.9 billion in
procurement and development funding with much more planned for the outyears.").
Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001,
23.
Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 220 (2000). This action was followed up by a legislative
requirement for the Department of Defense to provide periodic roadmaps, the latest of
which was released in 2013. DEP'T OF DEF., FY 2013-2038 UNMANNED SYSTEMS
INTEGRATED ROADMAP (2013), available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/DOD-USRM2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/5XPTK7KX] (archived Sept. 22, 2014).
See TEAL GRP. CORP., WORLD UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE SYSTEMS:
24.
MARKET PROFILE AND FORECAST 1 (2011); Press Release, Teal Grp. Corp., Teal Group
Predicts Worldwide UAV Market Will Total $91 Billion in Its 2014 UAV Market Profile
and Forecast (July 17, 2014), http://tealgroup.co/index.php/about-teal-group[http://perma.cc/H8CU-WS9H]
corporation/press-releases/118-2014-uav-press-release
(archived Oct. 25, 2014).
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armed combat missions. The most prominent of these operations have
taken place in the so-called War on Terror in Afghanistan and a
range of other countries. 25 The prevalence of UAVs is summed up by
one industry executive who stated in the context of the military
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that "every second of every day,
40 Predator-series aircraft are airborne worldwide, while the hours
that various UAVs by the Air Force are in operation has more than
tripled between 2006 and 2009, . . . standing at 295,000 hours per

year."26 While this number has since declined, the steady rise of
funding for UAV research and use of UAVs in combat operations is
unlikely to be halted in the near future.

25.
For the controversy surrounding the use of UAVs in the elimination of
known terrorists and terrorist suspects, see Peter Finn, A Future for Drones:
Automated Killing, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2011, at A01 (demonstrating that UAVs
remove any human discrimination during targeting); Siobhan Gorman, Drones Evolve
Into Weapon in Age of Terror, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2011, at A6 (explaining how the
drone program has greatly expanded under the Obama administration). See generally
Ryan Vogel, Drone Warfare and The Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENVER J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 101 (2010) (providing a lengthy analysis of drone warfare including history,
implications in international law, and pervasive sources of criticism); PETER BERGEN &
KATHERINE TIEDEMANN, Washington's Phantom War: The Effects of the U.S. Drone
Program in Pakistan, 90 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, no. 4, 2011, at 12 (describing the
controversy surrounding U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan and prospective challenges for
reform).
For the debate about use of drones and targeted killing, see United Nations,
Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions, TT 28-92, U.N. Doc. No. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010)
[hereinafter Alston, Special Rapporteur] (discussing legal issues surrounding targeted
killings); United Nations, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While
Countering Terrorism, Ben Emmerson,
21-74 U.N. Doc. No. A/HRC/25/59 (Mar. 11,
2014) [hereinafter Emmerson, Special Rapporteur] (focusing on drone strikes during
armed conflict and its civilian impact); United Nations, Human Rights Council, Report
of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Christof
Heyns,
26-126, U.N. Doc. No. A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Heyns,
Special Rapporteur] (focusing on lethal autonomous robotics and the protection of life).
See generally NILS MELZER,

TARGETED

KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW

(2008)

(providing an analysis of several facets of targeted killings); Mary Ellen O'Connell, The
InternationalLaw of Drones, 14 ASIL INSIGHTS, no. 36, Nov. 12, 2010 (reviewing the
history of drones deployed by the U.S. and addressing international law concerns and
the future of drone strikes); David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists:
Extra-JudicialExecutions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171
(2005) (analyzing the implications of targeted killings in international law with
emphasis on U.S. attacks in Yemen and Israeli practices); Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren
R. Michaeli, "We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law" A Legal Analysis of the
IsraeliPolicy of Targeted Killings, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 233 (2003) (focusing on Israeli
policy to highlight the controversy surrounding targeted killings).
26.
Rise of the Drones: Unmanned Systems and the Future of War: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec. and ForeignAffairs of the Comm. on Oversight and
Gov't Reform, 111th Cong. 61-62 (2010) (statement of Michael S. Fagan, Chair,
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Advocacy Comm., Ass'n for Unmanned Vehicle Sys. Int'l).
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B. Remote Control and Automation as Stepping-Stones Toward
Autonomy
UAVs, as a subset of UMS, are only a stepping-stone toward
greater autonomy. It is important to distinguish between different
27
levels of autonomy, at least for conceptual purposes. The different
types of unmanned systems can be usefully grouped into three
different categories, although these classifications are more
realistically described as existing on a spectrum that moves from
human-controlled systems towards full autonomy: remotely operated
operate
that
systems
and
systems,
automated
systems,
28
an
serve
categories
the
among
The distinctions
autonomously.

There is a confusing lack of clarity in the use of terminology with respect to
27.
remotely operated, automated, and autonomous systems. The designations used here
are not necessarily shared by other commentators or organizations, although there
appears to emerge general agreement as to the delineations of the content of the
different categories.
For a more fine-grained differentiation, see Lisa Jo Elliott & Bryan
28.
Stewart, Automation and Autonomy in Unmanned Aircraft Systems, in INTRODUCTION
TO UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 99-122 (Richard K. Barnhart et al. eds., 2011). For a
useful and detailed distinction between automation and autonomy, see William C.
Marra & Sonia K. McNeil, Understanding "The Loop": Regulating the Next Generation
of War Machines, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1139, 1149-60 (2013).
Different classifications or designations exist in the literature on AWS. A similar
terminology to the one used here is employed by Alan Backstrom & Ian Henderson,
New Capabilities in Warfare: An Overview of Contemporary Technological
Developments and the Associated Legal and Engineering Issues in Article 36 Weapons
Reviews, 94 INT'L REV. RED CROSS, no. 886, Summer 2012, at 483, 487 ("Automated and
autonomous weapon systems need to be distinguished from remotely operated weapon
systems."). See generally Darren M. Stewart, New Technology and the Law of Armed
Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR,
INTERNATIONAL LAw STUDIES 271 (Raul A. Pedrozo & Daria P. Wollschlaeger eds., vol.
80, 2011) (providing a lengthy analysis of the fast progression of AWS and the
accompanying adaption of the law of armed conflict).
Largely commensurate with the distinctions drawn here are the definitions
employed by the U.S. DoD and Human Rights Watch, which were released in close
proximity with one another. See Directive 3000.09, Autononomy in Weapon Systems
13-14 (Dep't of Def. 2012) [hereinafter DoD Directive], available at www.dtic.mil
/whs/directives/corres/pdfl300009p.pdf [http://perma.cclE9YB-JPNH] (archived Sept. 22,
2014) (defining, among other terms, "autonomous weapon system," "human-supervised
autonomous system," and "semi-autonomous weapon system"); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS 2 (2012), available at
[httpJ/perma.ccl
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload.0-O.pdf
C3NJ-XTDW| (archived Sept. 22, 2014) (dividing robotic weapons into three categories:
"Human-in-the-Loop Weapons," "Human-on-the-Loop Weapons," and "Human-out-ofthe-Loop Weapons"). While the differences in the definitions themselves are not large,
neither the designation of all iterations of all UMS as "autonomous," nor the use of the
term "robot" appear accurate to convey what characterizes systems in each of these
categories. Fully remote-controlled or automated systems do not possess any
appreciable degree of autonomy, therefore making the term meaningless. The term
robot is overly broad and is not amenable to the differentiations necessary for a fruitful
debate. One result of the designation of all of the categories-remotely-operated,
automated and autonomous-as some form of autonomy is the claim that "autonomous
weapons . .. already exist." This is only the case if, as the author does, one subscribes
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important purpose, namely to separate the existing weapon
systems-which are either automated or remotely operated-from
those future systems that will function in an autonomous manner.
Complicating this distinction is the fact that unmanned systems may
operate in more than one, or indeed all three, operating modes.
Confusingly, a number of authors use the terms autonomy and
automation interchangeably, without realizing that each category
implies a different set of legal and ethical questions. Human
operators are much more closely tied to the decision-making loop in
the case of remotely operated and automated systems. 29
Proponents generally cite as advantages of UMS, over manned
alternatives, that they allow for conducting missions over a longer
time period and have more precise targeting, which can lead to a
reduction in civilian casualties, although this outcome is not
assured.a0 Moreover, the use of UMS reduces the risks to a military's
own troops. However, UMS critics point out that the widespread use
of such systems can lead to information overload. The amount of
information available makes it difficult to separate information that
is necessary from that which is not. 1 Furthermore, some claim that
the increased physical and emotional distance inherent in certain
variants of UMS lead to a higher likelihood of attacks taking place.82
Finally, there are reports that the decreased risks to one's own
soldiers encourage certain missions that would have previously been
deemed too risky. 8 While the current generation of UMS retains the
to the broad definition of autonomy used in the DoD Directive. But see Allyson
Hauptman, Autonomous Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict, 218 MIL. L. REV. 170,
170 (2013) (defining an AWS as one that "once active, can select and engage a target
without further intervention by a human operator."). Indeed, it could be argued that
the definition by the DoD is counterproductive for argumentative purposes. Under its
definition, all weapon systems, whether remotely operated, automated, or autonomous,
can be designated as autonomous.
29.
A similar distinction is drawn by the International Committee of the Red
Cross. See Red Cross, Contemporary Armed Conflicts, supra note 11, at 38-40
(distinguishing between remote controlled weapons systems, automated weapons
systems, and autonomous weapons systems). For a similar view regarding the
distinction between remotely-operated and automated systems on one hand, and AWS
on the other, with respect to different legal and ethical considerations, see Stewart,
supra note 28, at 289 (distinguishing the implications for accountability arising from
remotely controlled and automated systems versus autonomous systems).
30.
See Jack M. Beard, Law and War in the Virtual Era, 103 AM. J. INT'L L.
409, 423-24 (2009) (suggesting that virtual techonlogies are redefining success in
warfare by making casualties less avoidable); FY 2009-2034 UNMANNED SYSTEMS,
supra note 5, at 7-15 (describing the general benefits of increasingly autonomous
systems); RONALD C. ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS

192-212 (2009) (providing illustrative graphics to depict how the technology and its
operators could potentially discriminate targets).
31.
SINGER, WIRED, supra note 3, at 395-96 (observing that information
presented through a virtual medium can lead an operator to lose touch with reality).
32.
Id. (referencing several studies that show how disconnection and distance
create an environment in which atrocities are psychologically easier to commit).
33.
See Peter Asaro, How Just Could a Robot War Be?, in FRONTIERS IN
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND APPLICATIONS: CURRENT ISSUES IN COMPUTING AND
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strong involvement of human decision-making, there are already
developments underway to have one set of operators be responsible
for a number of UMS. 84 But for now, the current generation of UMS
is still characterized by a clear line of responsibility establishing who
is responsible for carrying out an attack.
Remotely operated systems-referred to as "semi-autonomous
systems" by the DoD,8 5 and systems with a "human in the loop" by
Human Rights Watch (HRW) 3 6-have been in existence for some
time. However, the extent of their use has greatly increased over
recent years, evidenced by the number of combat operations in
Afghanistan and elsewhere.3 7 The most well-known examples of
UAVs that are currently being deployed in large numbers are the
MQ-1 Predator and the MQ-9 Reaper. Both systems are important in
surveillance and combat support mode but increasingly carry out
armed combat missions. It is that use of these systems that has
garnered the strongest public debates.8 8 Most of these systems are
operated from ground bases via satellite links, sometimes at a
considerable distance. Remotely operated systems also exist in landbased and naval versions. Land-based systems are oftentimes used to
detect explosive ordinance. In contrast, UAVs have been used
extensively in a variety of missions, including reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition.39 Marine systems also exist, but

PHILOSOPHY 50, 56-58 (Adam Briggle, Katinka Waelbers, & Philip Brey eds., 2008)

(drawing a parallel between gaining public approval for airstrikes in Kosovo and Iraq
and the ease with which leaders could craft propaganda to begin a robot-centric
offensive); Patrick Lin, George Bekey & Keith Abney, Robots in War: Issues of Risk and
Ethics, in ETHICS AND ROBOTICS 49, 62 (Rafael Capurro & Michael Nagenborg eds.,
2009).
34.

FY 2009-2034 UNMANNED SYSTEMS, supra note 5, at 7, 28 (establishing

levels of performance desired to achieve unmanned solutions in the future).
The DoD definition is as follows: "[a] weapon system that, once activated, is
35.
intended to only engage individual targets or specific target groups that have been
selected by a human operator." DoD Directive, supra note 28, at 14.
HRW defines this category as follows: "[r]obots that can select targets and
36.
deliver force only with a human command." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28.
Alan S. Brown, The Drone Warriors, 132 MECHANICAL ENGINEERING, no. 1,
37.
Jan. 2010, at 22, 24-25 (reporting the exponential growth in unmanned aerial vehices
and ground robots used by the U.S. in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan). See generally
MATT J. MARTIN & CHARLES W. SASSER, PREDATOR: THE REMOTE-CONTROL AIR WAR
OVER IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: A PILOT'S STORY (2010) (providing personalized combat
stories of a soldier utilizing remotely piloted aircraft).
See Jane Mayer, The Predator War - What are the Risks of the C.I.A.'s
38.
Covert Drone Program?, NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, at 36. In the wider context of
targeted killing and its international legal implications, see Alston, Special
Rapporteur, supra note 25 (discussing legal and policy issues surrounding targeted
killings).
Elizabeth Quintana, The Ethics and Legal Implications of Military
39.
Unmanned Vehicles 1 (British Computer Society Occasional Paper, 2008), available at

[http://perma.cclK8XK-Q7AD]
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/RUSI-ethics.pdf
(archived Sept. 22, 2014) (stating that the majority of UAVs "are used for surveillance,
reconnaisance and target destination"). For an overview of U.S. ground UMS, see FY
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while their area of operation has the advantage of not being subject to
physical land barriers, underwater communication remains a hurdle
for widespread adoption. 40
Automated systems have similarly been deployed for quite a long
time. They are referred to as either "human in the loop"4 1 or a
"human-supervised autonomous system." 42 Automated systems
function in a self-contained manner once deployed, at least for some
of their critical functions, but rely on specific information
programmed either prior to or during deployment. They subsequently
follow those parameters, deviating only on the basis of newly
programmed information. More modern examples include automated
sentry guns, sensor-fused ammunition, and most cruise missiles. 43
More advanced incarnations include Counter-Rocket, Artillery,
Mortar systems (C-RAM systems), of which both naval and landbased systems are in use. Moreover, some surveillance systems, such
as the Global Hawk, can fall into the automated system category if
they follow a pre-programmed flight path. 44 Capable of staying in the
air for over thirty hours and flying at altitudes up to 65,000 feet, the
Global Hawk carries out surveillance missions in either an automated
or remote controlled fashion. 45 While such systems do not require a
human to command them, there is often very considerable human
involvement both prior to deployment and by way of oversight during
a mission. However, once a mission is underway, automated systems
are capable of independently detecting the target or threat they were
designed to counter and engage the target following one or more
specified characteristics.
One could consider mines to fall under the category of AWS as
mines are built to respond to certain characteristics, such as
proximity, contact, strong magnetic signal, and/or weight. Mines,
however, do not act autonomously within the parameters of the
2009-2034 UNMANNED SYSTEMS, supra note 5, at 31 (establishing the specific
performance attiributes for the ground domain).
40.
Quintana, supra note 39, at 6 (suggesting that, because radio frequency is
short, it is nearly useless underwater and that the alternative of sonar is not
substantially better).
41.
HRW defines them as "[riobots that can select targets and deliver force
under the oversight of a human operator who can override the robots' actions." HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28.

42.
The DoD defines this category as "[a]n autonomous weapon system that is
designed to provide human operators with the ability to intervene and terminate
engagements, including in the event of a weapon system failure, before unacceptable
levels of damage occur." DoD Directive, supra note 28, at 14.
43.
See Stewart, supra note 28, at 276 (separating the technologies into
categories and providing the current state of the evolution of each); Quintana, supra
note 39, 1-2 (describing "[t]he largest and most capable operational UAVs"); ARKIN,
supra note 30, at 10-27 (providing photographs and descriptions of each of these
technologies).
44.
Stewart, supra note 28, at 276 (describing Global Hawk as a UAS whose
flight commands usually do not require a human operator).
45.
Quintana, supra note 39, at 1-2.
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definition laid out above, nor those currently proffered by the DoD or
HRW. Mines fall arguably into the category of automated weapons
that react to a particular trigger but have no mechanism that would
allow them to make discretionary decisions. 46
The final category consists of AWS, which are referred to by the
DoD as "autonomous weapons systems" 47 and by HRW as a "human
out of the loop weapon."4 8 Unlike remote controlled systems and
automatic systems, AWS do not depend on human input immediately
prior to, or during, their use. There are at least two characteristics
that define the notion of autonomy in the specific context of AWS.
First is the ability to operate independently and engage targets
without being programmed to specifically target an individual object
or person. This includes the capability to react to a changing set of
circumstances, and requires that the rules of IHL be "translated" into
machine code. The second, interrelated, aspect is the capability to
make discretionary decisions. The actions of AWS are therefore, in
contradistinction to automated systems, predictable only within the
range that they were programmed. The definitions provided by both
the DoD and HRW do not include this crucial element. 49 Deciding
which targets to engage, as well as how and when to carry out an
attack, would be left to the AWS's software that is programmed to
deal with a myriad of situations and changing sets of circumstances.50
While there is still some human involvement prior to sending AWS on
a mission (e.g., fueling and arming), AWS will be able to carry out

46.
This is true even for advanced naval mines, such as the Mark 60 Captor
system. The weapon is designed to react to particular sonar signatures even in the
(unlikely) scenario in which a friendly force may have captured the opposing side's
naval vessel. See MK 60 Encapsulated Torpedo (CAPTOR), FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS,
MIL. ANALYSIS NETWORK, http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/dumb/mk60.htm [http://
perma.cclP9M8-8Y5J] (archived Oct. 25, 2014).
47.
The DoD defines AWS as "[a] weapon system that, once activated, can
select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator. This
includes human-supervised autonomous weapon systems that are designed to allow
human operators to override operation of the weapon system, but can select and engage
targets without further human input after activation." DoD Directive, supra note 28, at
13.
HRW defines AWS as "[r]obots that are capable of selecting targets and
48.
delivering force without any human input or interaction." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 28.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text. A report by the government of
49.
the United Kingdom, while not using the term discretion, uses a similar distinction.

See

U.K. DEP'T OF DEF., JOINT DOCTRINE NOTE 2/11 - THE UK APPROACH TO
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS T 205 (2011) [hereinafter UK DOD JOINT DOCTRINE]

(providing a table that compares an automated system with an autonomous system).
Whether or not it will be possible to program AWS in a way that allows
50.
them to operate in conformity with the existing rules of international humanitarian
law-specifically the requirements of the principles of distinction and proportionalityremains to be seen. For a more detailed analysis, see infra Part III.B-C.
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missions with a much higher degree of independence than automated
systems. 51
III. LEGAL CHALLENGES To AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS
Part III analyzes the legal challenges presented by the
introduction of AWS to the two main principles in IHL, namely the
principle of distinction and the principle of proportionality. While the
former may be amenable to a certain degree of quantitative analysis,
there are serious uncertainties as to whether the same is true for the
latter, at least for the foreseeable future. In addition, it will be
necessary to establish clear lines of accountability when AWS are
deployed in order to avoid a system of organized irresponsibility. 52
This Part begins with a brief introduction to the principles of
distinction and proportionality within the wider framework of IHL,
followed by a discussion of both principles in greater detail. Lastly,
this Part will examine individual responsibility.
A. Introduction

IHL has developed over more than a century with a two-fold
aim: on the one hand the protection of civilians from combat5 3 and of
soldiers from unnecessary suffering and cruelty; 54 on the other hand
allowing activities to attain military objectives to go forward. The
principle of distinction and the principle of proportionality have
evolved from this process and reflect the tension between these
opposite goals. The former embodies the necessity of differentiating
military personnel and militarily significant targets from civilians

51.
For an early stage of development, see Finn, supra note 25, at A01
(describing a demonstration in Fort Benning, Georgia in which automated, unpiloted
planes confirmed tarp targets and stating that "[tihe demonstration laid the
groundwork for scientific advances that would allow drones to search for a human
target and then make an identification based on facial-recognition or other software.").
52.
States wishing to deploy AWS will also have comply with the requirements
of Protocol I, Article 36, which mandates that each State Party determine whether the
employment of a new weapon, means or method of warfare that it studies, develops,
acquires or adopts would, in some or all circumstance, be prohibited by international
law. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 36, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter AP I], available at
https://treaties.un.org/doclPublication/UNTSNolume%201125/volume-1125-I-17512English.pdf [http://perma.cc/EN7Y-KVL8] (archived Nov. 25, 2014) ("In the study,
development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a
High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment
would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule
of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.").
53.
See AP I, supra note 52, pt. IV.
54.
Id. pts. I-III.
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and civilian objects, particularly those essential for civilians to
survive.5 5 The principle of proportionality embodies the requirement
that any attack which could have adverse consequences for civilians
must have a military objective which is not excessive with regard to
the potential civilian harm. 56
AP I entered into force in 1978 and currently has 174 states
parties, constituting an overwhelming majority of countries. 5 7 This
includes many states which can be expected to manufacture or
possess AWS, including China, France, Germany, Russia, and the
United Kingdom. Some key states, most notably the United States,
India and Israel, are not parties to AP I. Because both principles are
not only codified in AP I, but are also well established rules of
customary international law, the status of these countries as nonparties is less significant than it first appears. This is confirmed by
consistent statements by U.S. officials affirming the customary law
nature of many, though not all, provisions of AP 1.58 Indeed, the U.S.
has incorporated similar or identical language to the relevant
provisions of AP I into its military manuals, including those
pertaining to the principles of distinction and proportionality. 59
Moreover, notwithstanding a few highly controversial incidents, the
U.S. for some time has routinely required that proposed targeting
decisions for precision-guided munitions and "drone strikes" to be

55.
See infra Part III.B.
56.
See infra Part III.C.
57.
For the current status of ratification and accession, see ProtocolAdditional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), UNTC, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800f3586 [http://perma.cc/P8FE-GCB9] (archived Nov.
21, 2014).
Michael J. Matheson, Session One: The United States Position on the
58.
Relation of Customary InternationalLaw to the 1977 ProtocolsAdditional to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 419, 426 (1987); William Taft, The
Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 323
(2003) ("The U.S. military, in its actions since 9/11, has assiduously adhered to the
traditional rules associated with the use of military force" including "elements of the
Additional Protocols of 1977, including Articles 48 to 52 and Article 57."). In 2010,
then-Legal Advisor to the U.S. State Department Harold Hongju Koh made similar
statements before the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law.
Harold Hongju Koh, The Obama Administration and International Law, Mar. 25, 2010,
http://www.state.gov/s/releases/remarks/139119.htm ("In U.S. operations against alQaeda and its associated forces-including lethal operations conducted with the use of
unmanned aerial vehicles-great care is taken to adhere to these principles in both
planning and execution, to ensure that only legitimate objectives are targeted and that
collateral damage is kept to a minimum.") For reasons that led the U.S. to not ratify
AP I, see Abraham D. Sofaer, The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions on the Protection of War Victims, 82 AM. J. INT'L. L. 784 (1988).
See Christopher Greenwood, Customary Law Status of the Protocols, in
59.
HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD 93, 102-03 (Astrid J.
M. Delissen & Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991). See also infra notes 88-90 and
accompanying text.
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considered by military lawyers, largely to assure that the actions in a
particular case are consistent with international law. 60
A number of authors argue that the current body of IHL is
insufficient to capture the challenges that AWS present; however, it
is not always clear on what basis such arguments are made.6 1
Throughout its history, IHL has shown a considerable capability to
adapt its functional rules to meet challenges presented by newly
developed weapon systems. IHL contains general principles and
generally applicable rules to a variety of weapon systems, rather than
focusing on one individual technology. The existing rules of IHL are
capable of responding to AWS, despite considerable differences in
opinion that exist in interpreting these rules.
Article 48 AP I describes the general principle of protecting
civilians in armed conflict. It posits: "In order to ensure respect for
and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the
Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and
military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives." 6 2 Subsequent provisions contain more
specific rules and provide further details as to both the principle of
distinction and the principle of proportionality. Moreover, both
principles are testament to the requirements that combat be carried
out in a humane fashion and military action only be taken as far as
militarily necessary.

60.

James A. Burger, InternationalHumanitarian Law and the Kosovo Crisis:

Lessons Learned or to be Learned, 837 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 129
(2000); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS (CLAMO), LAW AND MILITARY
OPERATIONS IN Kosovo: 1999-2001, LESSONS LEARNED FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 59

(2001), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdflLessons-LearnedKosovo.pdf
[http://perma.cc/27UB-69TG] (archived Nov. 21, 2014).
61.
For authors staking out a position that the current legal framework is
inadequate, see ARKIN, supra note 30, at 72; Hin-Yan Liu, Categorizationand Legality
of Autonomous and Remote Weapons Systems, 94 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 627, 629
(2012); Marchant, supra note 10 (suggesting that the development of autonomous
decision-making ability in robots creates moral issues that the current body of
international law cannot adequately address). See generally ARMIN KRISHNAN, KILLER
ROBOTS: LEGALITY AND ETHICALITY OF AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS (2009) (contending that

the rate of robotic techonology will render current international law largely
inoperable).
Others consider the existing framework as adequate. See Markus Wagner, Taking
Humans Out of the Loop: Implications for InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 21 J.L.,
INFO. & SCl. 155, 159-62 (2011) [hereinafter Wagner, Humans] (using existing legal
frameworks regarding the principles of distinction and proportionality to analyze the
impact of autonomous technology); Stewart, supra note 28, at 289 (agreeing that the
law will evolve to meet the pressing requirements of a new era of autonomous
weaponry); Marco Sassbli, Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian
Law: Advantages, Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified, 90 INT'L
L. STUD. 308, 323 (2014) (rejecting that IHL is inadequate to address autonomous
weapons and the need for a new category of rules). Authors within the latter group
differ as to the application of the existing rules of IHL to AWS.
62.
AP I, supra note 52, art. 48.
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The tension between military necessity and humanity is one of
the main characteristics of IHL.63 There is considerable disagreement
as to where the balance should be struck on the continuum of military
necessity and humanity. There is also disagreement as to what
degree extant circumstances-including advances in military
technology, the acceptability of civilian casualties in the court of
public opinion, 64 and potentially more fundamental changes in the
role of state sovereignty 6 5-should influence military decisions. 66
These discussions are evidence of a development away from a
military-centric approach toward one that increasingly takes
humanitarian considerations into account. 67
AWS would have to be able to execute their combat operations in
full compliance with these rules. This requires the conversion of these

63.
See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in
InternationalHumanitarianLaw: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT'L L.
795 (2010) (examining the current state of military necessity, its future, and the
balance it must strike with International Humanitarian Law); Stewart, supra note 28,
at 272.
64.
See, e.g., WESLEY K. CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR: BOSNIA, KOSOVO, AND
THE FUTURE OF COMBAT 444 (1st ed. 2001). Clark notes that restrictive rules of
engagement in the 1999 Kosovo conflict meant that "[tihe weight of public opinion was
doing to us what the Serb air defense system had failed to do: limit our strikes." Id.
65.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Appeals Chamber
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 97 (Oct. 2,
1995) (providing examples of why international legal rules have emerged to regulate
armed conflict solely within a state); Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A,
Appeals Chamber Judgment, 1 172 (Feb. 20, 2001) (stating that there should be no
distinction between two legal regimes that commit the same egregious acts, regardless
of the nature of the conflict).
66.
Originally conceived in the Preamble of the Convention Respecting The
Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899. See the so-called Martens Clause:
"Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties
think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them,
populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles
of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized
nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience."
International Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July
29, 1899 [1901] ATS 131 [hereinafter War on Land]; see also Theodor Meron, The
Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience, 94 AM. J.
INT'L L. 78, 79 (2000).
See generally Meron, supra note 1 (providing an in-depth account of the
67.
increased focus on human rights in humanitarian law). This may already be evident by
the change in designation that this legal field has undergone-from "law of war" to
"law of armed conflict" and now "international humanitarian law." For a discussion on
the different uses of the terms, see Eyal Benvenisti, Human Dignity in Combat: The
Duty to Spare Enemy Civilians, 39 ISR. L. REV. 81, 83 (2006) (proposing that the
tension between the two concepts has the positive affect of leading actors towards
humanitarian ideals); see also David Luban, Military Necessity and the Cultures of
Military Law, 26 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 315, 316 (2013) (describing the two conceptions of
law as fundamentally different). Given the widespread and large-scale atrocities in
recent conflicts (e.g., Cambodia, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone,
Afghanistan and the Congo) it is not entirely obvious that armed conflict becomes more
humane.
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legal rules into a digital format, which the computer applies to a
given situation. It is not clear whether computers, which are very
capable of computing quantitative assessments by design, are also
capable of making qualitative assessments in the changing
environments they may face during highly fluid conflict situations.
Notwithstanding impressive advances in cognitive technologies, it
remains to be seen whether the principle of distinction and the
principle of proportionality can be encoded into digital format.6 8
Moreover, programs underlying AWS will also have to allow for
different degrees of combat intensity while remaining within the IHL
framework. Programs would have to be constructed in a way to
conform to such a policy change. 69 Recent action in Afghanistan may
serve as an example as pressure from the Afghan government, after a
series of military actions that included the targeting of civilian
objectives, caused the U.S. military to change its tactics.7 0
B. The Principle of Distinction
According to the principle of distinction, military action must
distinguish between combatants and civilians as well as between
military and civilian objects. Distinguishing between a person and an
object that possesses a military character-as opposed to an object
that is of a civilian character-is the first step in deciding whether a
person or object can be lawfully targeted. IHL is based on the
assumption that an individual who is not a combatant is a civilian.
This assumption is incorporated in the 1868 Declaration of St.
Petersburg, the earliest international instrument in the field of
international humanitarian law. 7 ' Subsequent codifications68.
On the potential for machine learning in this context, see Backstrom &
Henderson, supra note 28, at 493-94 (creating a hypothetical technology that can
process distinction to illustrate the future possibilities).
69.
See C.J. Chivers, A Changed Way of War in Afghanistan's Skies, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2012, at Al (proposing that, as the use of air power continues to change
during the Afghan conflict, aerial drones are an integral part of a successful war effort
and must be used intelligently to avoid irreversible political backlash).
70.
Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting and International HumanitarianLaw in
Afghanistan, 39 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 307, 312 (2009) [hereinafter Schmitt, Targeting].
For news report about this change, see Carlotta Gall, Afghan PresidentAssails U.S.Led Airstrike That He Says Killed 95, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2008, at A6 (illustrating
this principle with a report regarding a U.S. airstrike and subsequent accounts that
were inconsistent). These developments have contributed to a dramatic increase in the
NATO forces' demand for UAVs and critical UAV surveillance capabilities. See David
Ignatius, What a Surge Can't Solve in Afghanistan, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2008, at B7
(noting that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has pushed for a major increase in ISR
assets in Afghanistan); Anna Mulrine, Drones Fill the Troops Gap in Afghanistan, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 25, 2008, at 30 (reporting an increase of 12,000 additional
troops and high demand for UAVs).
71.
The preamble states: "[T]he only legitimate object which States should
endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy."
Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
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including the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land through its annex72 and the additional protocols to the
1949 Geneva Conventions 73-reaffirmed this rule.
Article 48 AP I contains this idea explicitly, and subsequent
provisions refine this rule by outlawing the targeting of individual
civilians7 4 unless they take a direct part in hostilities7 5 or target
historic monuments, works of art, or places of worship. 76 Moreover,
AP I prohibits not only attacks on civilians or objects of a civilian
nature, but also attacks on objects that are "indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population," the natural environment, and
"installations containing dangerous forces.""
Military objectives are considered to be those that by "nature,
location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage."78 Only when both the specific
characteristic (i.e., the "nature, location, purpose or use make[s] an
effective contribution to military action") and the damage or
neutralization offers a military advantage at the time may an object
be considered military under AP I. Each of these elements has been
Grammes Weight, St. Petersburg, Dec. 11, 1868 [hereinafter St. Petersburg
Declaration].
72.
War on Land, supra note 61 (providing for the distinction between lawful
and unlawful targets; for example, Article 25 states that "[tihe attack or bombardment,
by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is
prohibited."). Allusions to the principle of distinction are prevalent throughout the
preamble, for example, "[t]hinking it important, with this object, to revise the general
laws and customs of war, either with a view to defining them with greater precision or
to confining them within such limits as would mitigate their severity as far as
possible," and "these provisions, the wording of which has been inspired by the desire
to diminish the evils of war, as far as military requirements permit, are intended to
serve as a general rule of conduct for the belligerents in their mutual relations and in
their relations with the inhabitants." Id. pmbl.
73.
AP I, supra note 52, art. 48 ("In order to ensure respect for and protection
of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian
objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives.").
74.
Id. art. 51(2) ('The civilian population as such, as well as individual
civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary
purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.").
75.
Id. art. 52(3) ("Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this section,
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.").
76.
See id. art. 53 (providing that it is prohibited "(a) to commit any acts of
hostility directed against the historic monuments, works of art or places of worship
which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples; (b) to use such objects in
support of the military effort; (c) to make such objects the object of reprisals.").
77.
See id. arts. 54, 55, 56 (providing for the "[p]rotection of objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population," "[p]rotection of the natural
environment," and "[p]rotection of works and installations containing dangerous
forces").
78.
Id. art. 52(2).
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further clarified, 79 and is not necessarily static, but rather dynamic.8 0
This means that the military advantage that objects possess will have
to be reassessed constantly.
In addition, AP I contains provisions that prohibit certain
methods of attack, namely those that are by their nature
indiscriminate. 8 1 These rules are an expression of the idea that
underlies IHL (i.e. that an attacker must not only distinguish
between civilian and military targets but do so with weaponry that is
not indiscriminate). Therefore, if all that is available for an attack is
a weapon system that is designed to destroy a large-scale target, the
attack can only be carried out in a fashion that adheres to these
principles.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) found, in its Nuclear
Weapons advisory opinion that the principle of distinction not only
forms part of treaty law but has also found entry into customary
international law. It stated that "a great many rules of humanitarian
law applicable in armed conflict are . .. fundamental to the respect of
the human person and 'elementary considerations of humanity'."8 2
The Court appears to have elevated the principle of distinction to the
level of jus cogens when it considered it to "constitute [an]
intransgressible principle ... of international customary law."83
While there is some opposition to this finding, there is little doubt

79.
CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF
8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949
2020-24 (1987).

80.
See Markus Wagner, Autonomy in the Battlespace: Independently Operating
Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW AND THE CHANGING TECHNOLOGY OF WAR 99, 112 (Dan Saxon ed. 2012) ("The

element of use makes clear that IHL incorporates a dynamic element in that civilian
objects may become mlitary targets if they are being used by the enemy for military
ends.").
81.
AP I, supra note 52, art. 51(4) stating:
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: (a) those
which are not directed at a specific military objective; (b) those which employ a
method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military
objective; or (c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of
which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol.
82.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226 T 79 (July 8).
83.
Id.; see also Declaration on Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts,
G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII), 1(c), Sept. 24, 1968-Dec. 21, 1968, U.N. Doc. A/7433; GAOR,
23d Sess., Supp. No. 1748 (1968) (predating the additional protocols and affirming
"[tihat distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the
hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared
as

much as

possible");

DINAH

SHELTON,

INTERNATIONAL

LAW AND

"RELATIVE

NORMATIVITY" 159, 166 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed. 2006); Meredith Hagger & Tim
McCormack, Regulating the Use of Unmanned Combat Vehicles: Are General Principles
of International Humanitarian Law Sufficient?, 5 J.L., INFO. & SCI. 74 (2012). The
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission arrived at a similar conclusion. See Eritrea
Ethiopia Claims Commission: Partial Award, 45 I.L.M 396, 417, 425 (2006).
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that the principle of distinction has attained the status of customary
international law.84

However, putting these principles into practice is challenging.
This relates most often to targets that are not only civilian in nature,
but also serve a military purpose. Examples of such dual-use targets
85
include bridges as well as broadcasting or energy networks.
Individuals have differences in opinion over what constitutes a legal
target under the principle of distinction, and it is far from clear whose
analysis should be used to formulate a code that would eventually
determine the appropriateness of an attack. The importance of
finding an answer to this question is even greater given the complex
86
environments of today's conflicts. Military and civilian objects in
today's battle spaces are increasingly intertwined, making the
principle of distinction ever more crucial.
AWS must be able to determine whether a particular target is
civilian or military.8 7 This would have to be determined in an
abstract and a priori fashion. When there is doubt over whether a
88
person or object is a lawful target, it is presumed to be a civilian.
AWS will have to be accordingly programmed to abort missions in
such instances. AWS would only be allowed to attack after a sufficient
number of pre-programmed characteristics have been reconciled with
targets that are deemed legal under the principle of distinction.
Importantly, this type of analysis is largely based on quantitative

See W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 174
84.
(noting that there is "general agreement" in the international community about the
principle of distinction); Taft, supra note 58, 323 (stating that the September 11
atttacks "clarified for the world community the elemental considerations of humanity
that lie at the heart of the law of armed conflict").
See Christine Byron, International Humanitarian Law and Bombing
85.
Campaigns: Legitimate Military Objectives and Excessive Collateral Damage, in Y.B.
INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 183-86 (Michael N. Schmitt, Louise Arimatsu & Tim
McCormack eds., vol. 13, 2010) (discussing, inter alia, electricity grids as dual use
objects); Marco Sass6li, Legitimate Targets of Attacks Under International
Humanitarian Law 7-8 (Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict
Research, Background Paper, 2003) (discussing power grids, factories, lines of
communication, and bridges as potentially useful for military purposes, even where
separate military infrastructures exist).
Cf. Michael N. Schmitt, War, Technology, and The Law of Armed Conflict,
86.
in THE LAW OF WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY: WEAPONRY AND THE USE OF FORCE,
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES 137, 148-49 (Anthony M. Helm ed., vol. 82, 2007)
[hereinafter Schmitt, War, Technology, and the Law of Armed Conflict].
See John S. Canning, Chief Engineer, Naval Surface Warfare Center,
87.
Presentation at Third Annual Disruptive Technology Conference, A Concept for the
Operation of Armed Autonomous Systems on the Battlefield (2006), available at
http://www.dtic.millndia/2006disruptive -tech/canning.pdf [http://perma.cc/R2DE-GZG4]
(archived Sept. 16, 2014) (proposing a mandate that UAVs would not target humans,
but only weapon systems). While this may minimize the risk for civilians somewhat, it
is unclear how this would alleviate the problem of, for example, wrongly targeting
someone carrying a rifle for safety reasons or for hunting purposes.
See AP I, supra note 52, arts. 50(1), 52(3) (regarding civilians and civilian
88.
objects, respectively); see also PILLOUD, supra note 79, $ 1911-21 (1987).
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data (shape, size, etc.). Given recent advances in technology, it does
not appear unrealistic that such a mechanistic matching may indeed
be possible with the required degree of accuracy for targets such as
tanks or larger military and radar installations.8 9 The task becomes
even easier if the target being attacked is in a remote land location,
on the high seas, or outer space.
The situation is much more problematic when determining
whether an individual constitutes a military target. Not only would
AWS have to be able to distinguish civilians from military personnel,
but it must also decide if a civilian is taking a "direct part in
hostilities." 90 These situations are challenging for humans to judge,
and it does not appear that the necessary contextual analysis is
amenable to easily programmable quantitative assessments at this
time. Some, therefore, suggest that AWS should only be allowed to
operate in situations in which no civilians or civilian objects could be
endangered. 91 While this sounds attractive initially, it is questionable
whether this is the purpose for which AWS were designed.
The following example illustrates the difficulty in making
determinations using the principle of distinction. During a counterinsurgency operation in a village, soldiers receive information that
combatants may be hiding inside a house. Unbeknownst to the
soldiers, no insurgents are present. Inside of the home, boys are
playing with a ball. The children kick the ball towards the gate as the
soldiers enter the main door. The male inhabitants of this area carry
a dagger called the kirpan92 for purely religious reasons. One of the

89.
Wagner, Humans, supra note 61, at 161. For a similar view, see Michael N.
Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, "Out of the Loop'" Autonomous Weapon Systems and
the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARv. NAT'L SEC. J. 231, 246 (2013) (noting that "the
inability of the weapons systems to distinguish bears on the legality of their use in
particular circumstances"). Note, however, that specifically with respect to Article
51(4)(c) AP I, there has been considerable controversy since it arguably contains
elements of proportionality, and thus, may not be merely a quantitative assessment.
See generally Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 119, 201 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008).

90.
AP I, supra note 52, art. 51(3). See generally id. art. 50 (negatively
delineating civilians); Sharkey, Evitability, supra note 9, at 788-89 (discussing the
inability of autonomous robots to discriminate between combatants and noncombatants as an ethical issue, and delineating ways in which autonomous robots are
limited in their ability to comply with the principle of distinction).
91.
See, e.g., Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 89 ("What has been missed in
much of the dialogue so far is that even an autonomous weapon system that is
completely incapable of distinguishing a civilian from a combatant or a military
objective from a civilian object can be used lawfully in certain environments. Not all
battlespaces contain civilians or civilian objects.").
92.

DORIS R. JAKOBSH, SIKHISM 60 (2012) (stating that the kirpan is viewed as

a ceremonial sword and can be a few inches or up to three feet long, representing the
Sikh struggle against injustice and oppression); see also Rishi Singh Bagga, Living by
the Sword: The Free Exercise of Religion and the Sikh Struggle for the Right to Carry a
Kirpan, 2 MOD. AM. 32 (2006) (focusing on the "conflict between American antiweapons regulations and a Sikh's duty to carry the kirpan").
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parents watching the children realizes that the children are in danger
and tries to warn them by screaming in their direction to stay away
from the gate. This type of situation is relatively easy to interpret for
humans; while the inhabitants could be interpreted as a threat-two
quickly approaching targets carrying weapons with another potential
target running toward the gate in an agitated manner-the children
would likely be seen as chasing after a ball and not as posing a
threat.
It is unclear whether AWS could interpret this situation
similarly. One could argue that it would be possible to ensure that
AWS would not consider the children as legitimate targets by
programming the AWS to not attack individuals below a certain
height or to understand that in a particular geographic area males
carry a dagger as a cultural symbol and not a weapon. However,
certain distinctions far surpass the abilities of today's robotics, at
least at this stage: distinguishing a weapon from a cultural or
religious symbol; distinguishing the agonized face of a person in fear
for her or his children from a threatening face; distinguishing
children playing from threats.9 3 Although humans and AWS alike
may make mistakes, it is clear that distinction analysis is highly
context-dependent in some situations. This type of analysis does not
rely on quantitative data-as is the case with the distinction between
a tank and a school bus-but rather requires qualitative analysis.
C. The Principle of Proportionality
Similar to the principle of distinction, the principle of
proportionality is designed to provide protection to the civilian
population during times of armed conflict. With respect to compliance
by AWS, the principle of proportionality creates potentially even
greater challenges than the principle of distinction. Unlike portions of
the distinction analysis, proportionality cannot be defined in the
abstract. The particular circumstances of the attack matter more for
the principle of proportionality than for the principle of distinction.94

93.

See Naomi Cahn, Poor Children: Child 'Witches" and Child Soldiers in

Sub-Saharan Africa, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 413, 418 (2006) (stating that similar
situations include children that are forced to carry weapons and who, for a system
flying at even low altitude, may look like combatants, and that other innocuous
behavior could include an individual carrying a rifle for hunting or protective
purposes).
WILLIAM H. BoOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 79
94.
(2009) ("[W]hat is proportionate can only meaningfully be determined in relation to an
attack on a particular occasion, perhaps at a specific time, using particular weapons
and specified attack profiles."); OLIVER O'DONOVAN, THE JUST WAR REVISITED 62
(2003) ("Methods of conflict . . . may expand upwards on the scale of destructiveness in
proportion to the scale of the threat they are likely to meet."); see YORAM DINSTEIN,
THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
131 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing instances in which civilians are used to shield military
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Proportionality entails balancing competing goals: the anticipated
direct military advantage and the prevention of excessive civilian
casualties or damage.
The principle of proportionality dates back to St. Thomas
Aquinas. He introduced the principle of double effect, which
contained an early version of the principle of proportionality. 95
Grotius took the idea further with a more advanced version of the
proportionality principle when he stated that, for the sake of saving
many, one "must not attempt anything which may prove the
destruction of innocents, unless for some extraordinary reason." 96 The
Declaration of St. Petersburg contained similar language, finding
that "the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to
accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the
enemy. . . [T]his object would be exceeded by the-employment of arms
which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render
their death inevitable."97
Throughout the twentieth century, a number of international
instruments contained precursors to the principle of proportionality."
The adoption of AP I in the late 1970s codified the principle and
found more widespread acceptance,99 without using that particular
language. However, the principle is reflected in numerous provisions
of AP I, specifically in Article 51(5)(b) and Article 57(2). Article
51(5)(b) AP I specifically states:

objectives and stating that "the appraisal whether civilian casualties are excessive in
relation to the military advantage anticipated must make alloweances for the fact that
- if an attempt is made to shield military objectives with civilians - civilian casualties
will be higher than usual.").
95.

T.A. CAVANAUGH, DOUBLE-EFFECT REASONING: DOING GOOD AND AVOIDING

EVIL 2, 180-81 (2006) ("In the theory of just war that may be traced back to Cicero via
Augustine and Aquinas, one finds criteria to evaluate going to war (fus ad belum) and
criteria to evaluate conduct in war (jus in bello)."); Thomas M. Franck, On
Proportionalityof Countermeasures in International Law, 102 AM J. INT'L L. 715, 723
(2008) (providing an earlier example of precursors to the principle).
96.
HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 321 (A.C. Campbell trans.,
Batoche Books, 2001) (1625) ("Though there may be circumstances, in which absolute
justice will not condemn the sacrifice of lives in war, yet humanity will require that the
greatest precaution should be used against involving the innocent in danger, except in
cases of extreme urgency and utility.").
97.
St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 71.
98.
William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Prtocol I in
Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 95-98 (1982) ("[A]lthough Protocol I contains
the first reasonably explicit codification of the rule of proportionality, earlier treaties
and related documents contain some provisions which are relevant to the subject."); see
also Franck, supra note 95, at 723-24 (referencing earlier documents and agreements
that provided foundation for the codfication of the rule of proportionality); Judith Gail
Gardam, Proportionalityand International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391, 394 (1993)
(discussing the origins of proportionality and stating that "[t]he doctrine of
proportionality was part of the Christian theory of the just war").
99.
See Bernard L. Brown, The ProportionalityPrinciple in the Humanitarian
Law of Warfare: Recent Efforts at Codification, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 134, 136 (1976)
(discussing efforts at codification of the proportionality principle in the 1970s).
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5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as
indiscriminate:

(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
100
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

While the rationale for this provision is to protect civilians
against non-discriminatory attacks, the inclusion of the term
"excessive," to denote the potential disproportionality of an attack,
has led to discussions of how an attack may comply with this
provision.1 0 ' Trying to define the term in the abstract has proven to
be impossible. This is not surprising, given the potential for constant
02
change in the relevant factors:1 on the one hand, there is the
concrete and direct military advantage; on the other hand, there is
the requirement to limit the incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof. In
order to alleviate these concerns, Article 57(2) AP I requires that
military commanders take precautions in order to avoid or minimize
incidental loss of life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian
objects.10 3 An attack in which there is civilian loss of life, injury, or
damage, would be "excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated."1 04 Because of the use of the same

AP I, supranote 52, art. 51(5).
100.
Fenrick, supra note 98, at 97 (stating that the terms "excessive" and
101.
disproportionate" are more or less interchangeable). Moreover, a number of countries
reportedly held the view that the incorporation of the principle of proportionality was
merely a codification of existing customary law. See id. at 104.
See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL
102.
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 273 (2010).
AP I, supra note 52, art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
103.
Id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii). The full provision reads:
104.
(a) those who plan or decide upon an attack shall:
(i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are
neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special
protection but are military objectives within the meaning of
paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it is not prohibited by the
provisions of this Protocol to attack them;
(ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of
attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing,
incidental loss or civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to
civilian objects;
(iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated;
(b) an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that
the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or
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terminology as in Article 51(5)(b) AP I, attempts to define the
obligation incumbent upon military commanders in the abstract have
not been successful. Rather, this determination must be made on a
case-by-case basis. The choice of wording in both provisions is a result
of the aforementioned tension between gaining military advantage
and protecting the civilian population. It has been suggested that the
discrepancy between the direct military advantage anticipated and
the loss of life, injury, and damage to civilian objects must be clearly
disproportionate.10 5 However, the wording of both provisions does not
support the inclusion of this element, and it is unclear what the
insertion of such a requirement adds. It does nothing to solve the
problem and tilts the scale against the protection of the civilian
population or civilian objects.
The proportionality principle weighs the incidental loss of
civilian life or damage to civilian objects against the anticipated
result of an attack at the time it was initiated (rather than the actual
outcome in hindsight). 0 6 Neither of these elements is static; both are
potentially subject to change. As one commentator puts it, "[tihe more
nebulous the military objective is, the greater the need for caution in
use of the weapons likely to cause 'excessive' collateral damage to
civilians or civilian objects." 0 7 Moreover, these factors are difficult to
quantify, as the quantities that are being measured-civilian losses
and military advantage-are dissimilar. 0 8 Because of that, "it is not
possible to establish any reasonably exact proportionality equation
between them."109
This has led some authors to claim that the principle of
proportionality is too vague a concept, and proportionality would only
be implicated when "acts have occurred that are tantamount to the
direct attack of the civilian population.""l0 While this result may be
unsatisfactory for some, this tension was succinctly spelled out by the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia in a report released in 2000.111 The report addressed the
that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated;
(c) effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the
civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.
105.
See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS AND LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 47 (2005); SOLIS, supra note 102, at 274.
106.
DINSTEIN, supra note 94, at 120.
107.
Id.

108.
Fenrick, supra note 98, at 102.
109. Id.
110.
Parks, supra note 84, at 173; see also Schmitt, Targeting,supra note 70.
111.
See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Final
Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 I.L.M. 1257, TT 48-52 (June

2014]

DEHUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

1397

difficulty of applying the principle of proportionality, stating "[o]ne
cannot easily assess the value of innocent human lives as opposed to
capturing a particular military objective." 1 2 Similar statements can
be found by academic authors" 8 as well as other international and
domestic tribunals." 4
Contrary to distinction analysis, proportionality assessment is
almost entirely a qualitative exercise.11 5 While some authors question
whether this involves a subjective analysis,11 6 it is generally agreed
that it is virtually impossible to assign numeric values to military
targets as well as civilian damage in the abstract.11 7 Thus, despite
voices to the contrary," 8 the value of destroying a radar installation
at a particular moment is impossible to determine a priori. It is
therefore impossible to predict how many civilians it is proportional

8, 2000) ("The main problem with the principle of proportionality is not whether or not
it exists but what it means and how it is to be applied.").
Id. 48.
112.
113.
See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 94, at 120-21 ("[S]ome commentators
confuse the term 'excessive' with 'extensive'. This is a misreading of the text.").
See, e.g., HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr.
114.
[Dec. 11, 2005], slip. op. 46, available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/FilesENG/02/
690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf [http://perma.cc/54EG-AQ4W] (archived Sept. 28, 2014)
("[Wlhen hostilities occur, losses are caused. The state's duty to protect the lives of its
soldiers and civilians must be balanced against its duty to protect the lives of innocent
civilians harmed during attacks on terrorists. That balancing is difficult when it
regards human life."). See generally Robin Geil, Land Warfare, in MAX PLANK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW.
See Tony Gillespie & Robin West, Requirements for Autonomous Unmanned
115.
Air Systems set by Legal Issues, 4 INT'L C2 J., no. 2, 2010, at 1, 13 (reasoning that the
principle of proportionality "clearly highlights the difference between quantitative and
qualitative decisions and the need for human decision-making").
See, e.g., Sass6li, supra note 61, at 332 (stating that critics view making a
116.
proportionality determination as involving "subjective judgments"). Even those who are
generally more enthusiastic about the use of AWS in armed conflict admit to the highly
context-specific nature of proportionality assessments, although then continue to claim
that such evaluations are "not in principle impossible." Schmitt & Thurnher, supra
note 89, at 256-57.
Robert Sparrow, Building a Better WarBot: Ethical Issues in the Design of
117.
Unmanned Systems for Military Applications, 15 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 169, 178
(2009) (positing that "decisions about what constitutes a level of force proportionate to
the threat posed by enemy forces are extremely complex and context dependent and it
is seemingly unlikely that machines will be able to make these decisions reliably for
the foreseeable future"); see BOOTHBY, supra note 94, at 233 ("There is ... at present no
known mechanical decision-making technology that can address essentially qualitative
factors, such as risks to civilians.").
See, e.g., Prosecutor v Stanislav Gali6, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Separate and
118.
Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Nieto-Navia, 104 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/galso031205e.pdf [http://perma.cclD9GZ-W9Y5] (archived Sept. 18, 2014) (turning to the
question of whether a campaign purposefully targeting civilians in Sarajevo was
conducted, and stating that "I recognize the potential for such a discussion, in its
mathematical abstraction of the underlying human suffering, to be misinterpreted as
trivializing the individual stories of hardship and sorrow told by every resident of
Sarajevo who testified before the Trial Chamber.").
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to kill in an attack on that installation.' 1 9 Technology such as the
collateral damage estimate (CDE) may be helpful in determining the
amount of damage that may result from a particular weapon in a
given situation, but it "fails to answer what constitutes excessive
collateral damage and otherwise does not incorporate a fully
integrated targeting analysis that applies IHL in the first
instance." 120 While such technology could be incorporated into AWS,
it would therefore not solve the basic problem of the relational
proportionality analysis required by IHL, as even its proponents
implicitly admit. 121 Because there are-often constantly changingvariables on both sides of the equation, and the balancing of values
depends on the individual making the calculation, the proportionality
principle is by its nature subjective and not easily amenable to an
agreed upon checklist.122 This difficulty exists not only for the
evaluation of risk to civilians or civilian objects, but also for the
evaluation of anticipated military advantage in a given situation. In
order to properly assess this quantity, AWS would have to be able to
evaluate the "concrete and direct military advantage anticipated"1 23
at the time an attack takes place.
The proportionality principle debate brings into doubt whether
it will be possible in the near future (if ever) to write computer code
which will adequately perform such a highly context-dependent
analysis. There are several challenges, as proportionality analysis
takes place in various stages. The difficulty of measuring qualitative

119.
See Franck, supra note 95, at 729 ("High on the list of problems
encountered in devision secondary rules applying the principle of proportionality to
combat-related events, as Michael Schmitt points out, is the 'apples and oranges'
phenomenon: the 'inherent diffuclty of valuation."'); DINSTEIN, supra note 94, at 133
("There is no objective possibility of 'quanitfying the factors of the equation', and the
process 'necessarily contains a large subjective element'.").
120.
Jason D. Wright, 'Excessive' Ambiguity: Analysing and Refining the
Proportionality Standard, 94 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 820, 833 (2012) (referencing the
importance of bearing in mind that such systems are generally used not for the
determination of whether an attack is proportionate, but at what level decisions over
whether to attack or not have to be made).
121.
See Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International
HumanitarianLaw: A Reply to the Critics, HARV. NAT'L SECURITY J. FEATURES 1, 20
(2013) [hereinafter Schmitt, Autonomous], http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/
2013/02/Schmitt-Autonomous-Weapon-Systems-and-IHL-Final.pdf
[http://perma.cc/
8UQU-Z2VP] (archived Sept. 28, 2014) (noting that "given the complexity and fluidity
of the modern battlespace," it is unlikely machines will be "programmable to perform
robust assessments of a strike's likely military advantage" in the near future).
122.
This subjective interpretation of the provision has been criticized as
allowing for abusive justifications which are ultimately hard, if not impossible, to
disprove. Cassese, for example, at the time argued for an objective standard and while
the standard may have been desirable, the wording of Article 51 AP I does not contain
such a more objective reference. See ANTONIO CASSESE, Means of Warfare: The
Traditional and the New Law, in THE NEW HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
161, 175 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979).
123.
AP I, supra note 52, art. 51(5)(b).
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information not only factors into target selection and the means and
methods of attack, but also impacts how to engage a particular target.
Thus, some of the most salient questions that will need to be
addressed are whether AWS can make the initial decision to attack,
whether AWS can decide which type of weapon to use, and how AWS
can engage a target under the principle of proportionality. These
questions require a relative weighing and balancing of oftentimes
shifting values.
With respect to target selection, a program would have to be
designed that is capable of handling a very large number of decisions.
If a system is to be truly autonomous, it is not enough to program
individual scenarios. Rather, it is necessary to code decision rules
that are capable of making decisions while weighing a myriad of
factors. Concerning the means to be employed, AWS would have to
determine the effect of each weapon under any given circumstance.
CDE may be helpful in this regard, although it does not analyze what
available weapons or means would cause the least amount of
suffering while achieving the same goal. Though seemingly easy in
the abstract, this determination is much more difficult in reality due
to constantly shifting circumstances and the close proximity of
civilians in modern battle spaces.
As pointed out above, there is no clear formula for these
determinations.124 Even after a considerable passage of time and a
considerable amount of discussion, there is no agreement over how
proportionality analysis could work in the abstract. Therefore, it is
dubious that a quantitative analysis would be capable achieving
acceptable results.

D. AWS and IndividualResponsibility
More often than not throughout the history of organizational
responsibility, it was the individuals fighting or guarding the front
lines-but almost never their superiors-that were held accountable
for their actions, even if their participation was only part of a larger
system. This was often true for military operations as well as for
police action. A recurring problem in these instances was that direct
participants in criminal acts often held positions with relatively little
power, yet those that designed the system were regularly able to
evade criminal responsibility. This changed somewhat with the
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals after World War II, when a number
of high-level officials were prosecuted.125 Yet even in more modern

See Backstrom & Henderson, supra note 28, at 492 (discussing the
124.
proportionality determination and the lack of a clear, determinative formula); Sass6li,
supra note 61, at 334 (providing more elaborate discussion and analysis of the precise
guideline language).
See generally Parks, supranote 84.
125.
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times, this phenomenon persists. There are many reasons why
holding individuals responsible for crimes committed in the battle
space is important. While a foundational idea of armed conflict is
that-unlike in times of peace-wounding or killing other individuals
is permissible, egregious behavior is nevertheless barred on the
grounds of reciprocity, deterrence, and morality.126 Some
commentators have argued that because of the difficulty of justifiably
holding an individual criminally responsible, it would be unethical to
use AWS in warfare.127
The introduction of AWS creates at least two paradoxes. First,
those who plan a military operation are further removed from actual
combat and have less influence than they previously had.' 2 8
Additionally, one must consider the code upon which AWS base their
decisions. It is unclear how this challenge will play out in future
combat operations in which it can be presumed that breaches of IHL
will continue to take place.1 29 A second paradox lies in the inherent
tension between increased levels of autonomy-one of the hallmarks
of AWS that distinguishes them from remotely operated or automated
systems-on the one hand, and the difficulty of assigning
responsibility on the other. Further distancing human combatants

126.

See generally Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, LAW &

CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958).

127.
See, e.g., Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24 J. APPLIED PHIL., no. 1, 2007, at
62, 66 [hereinafter Sparrow, Killer Robots] ("If ... it turns out that no-one can justly be
held responsible for the actions of these systems, then it will be unethical to use them
in war."); Heyns, Special Rapporteur, supra note 25 ("If each of the possible candidates
for responsibility identified above is ultimately inappropriate or impractical, a
responsibility vacuum will emerge, granting impunity for all LAR use.").
128.
There have been documented problems of UAVs operators mistakenly
attacking friendly forces. In the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, an Israeli drone
attacked Israeli ground troops. There have also been at least two occasions in the U.S.
war in Afghanistan where drones have been used to target individuals who, because
they stood out among other individuals because of their height, were mistaken to be
Osama bin Laden. Stanford Law School International Human Rights and Conflict
Resolution Clinic & NYU School of Law Global Justice Clinic, Living under Drones:
Death, Injury and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan, Sept.
2012 at 13; John Sifton, A Brief History of Drones, THE NATION, Feb. 7, 2012, available
at http://www.thenation.comlarticle/166124/brief-history-drones. See generally SINGER,
WIRED, supra note 3.
129.
For a contrary view, see ARKIN, supra note 30, at 30-31 ("It is not my belief
that an autonomous unmanned system will be able to be perfectly ethical in the
battlefield, but I am convinced that they can perform more ethically than human
soldiers are capable of."); see also Tami Davis Biddle, Air Power, in THE LAWS OF WAR:
CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 140,

141 (Michael Howard,

George J. Andreopoulos & Mark R. Shulman eds., 1994) (suggesting that the
emergence of more accurate bombing capabilities might lead to a convergence of "ethics
and efficiency" that could "bolster the prospects for adherence to international norms");
Schmitt, War, Technology, and the Law of Armed Conflict, supra note 86, at 163.
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from the battle space-not only physically, but also psychologically
and temporally-only exacerbates the problem. 130
While military planners insist that a human will remain in the
loop,1'1 it is apparent that the current mode of remotely operating
vehicles will be replaced by less direct oversight mechanisms. Several
models project that a team of operators will no longer command
individual combat vehicles, but rather be responsible for a much
larger force. These plans are due to projected budget constraints and
their technical feasibility.' 32
However, a problem arises where an operator does not have time
to directly oversee a particular action that an AWS has determined to
take. In such instances, the question of criminal responsibility is
especially acute. Similarly, there is an issue where the actions of
AWS lead to the commission of what would otherwise be considered a
war crime. This is not to say that AWS will "go rogue" in the sense of
contravening specific directions.1 33 If a weapon system with
autonomous capability were to contravene specific directions, its use
would be illegal under the rules of IHL. For example, imagine an
autonomous weapon system firing at a target despite its civilian
nature or in a situation in which soldiers have been wounded to such
an extent that they are no longer capable of fighting. The system may
have been programmed to act in such situations for a variety of
reasons: the cost of watching over the soldiers was too high, compared
to the utility of system in other parts of the battle space, or to instill
fear in onlookers.134 Moreover, it is possible that AWS malfunction,
which can happen to any weapon or weapon system. Likewise, AWS
are open to tampering or other interferences. However, this is an

130.
See M.L. Cummings, Creating Moral Buffers in Weapon Control Interface
Design, IEEE TECH. & Soc'Y MAG., Fall 2004, at 28, 29 (noting that "the impact of
computer-control on a user's sense of autonomy and moral responsibility" has "become
a topic of considerable ethical interest").
131.
See UK DOD JOINT DOCTRINE, supra note 49, 520 (discussing "[t]he role of
the human in the loop"); SINGER, WIRED, supra note 3, at 123-24 ("[P]eople speak in
such absolute terms and use the phrase 'man will always stay in the loop' so often that
it ends up sounding more like brainwashing than analysis.").
132.
See USAF FLIGHT PLAN, supra note 5, at 41 ("Increasingly humans will no
longer be 'in the loop' but rather 'on the loop' - monitoring the execution of certain
decisions. Simultaneously, advances in Al will enable systems to make combat
decisions and act within legal and policy constraints without necessarily requiring
human input."); M.L. Cummings, Operator Interaction with Centralized Versus
Decentralized UAV Architectures, in HANDBOOK OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 977
(Kimon P. Valavanis & George J. Vachtsevanos eds., forthcoming 2015) (discussing the
costs and large-scale feasibility of unmanned aerial vehicle use by military personnel).
133.
See Sassbli, supra note 61, at 326; Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 89, at
242 (stating that robots "will not 'go rogue'").
134.
See Sparrow, Killer Robots, supra note 127 (providing additional rationales,
such as "the robot ... seeking to revenge the 'deaths' of robot comrades recently
destroyed in battle"). Given the purported a-emotionality of AWS, this type of rationale
would require the very aspect that the proponents contend AWS do not have and make
them superior to humans, i.e. emotions such as revenge.
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analysis of those complex situations where the determinations of
AWS are made on the basis of the underlying code and result in
unforeseen consequences.1 35 The Report of the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, correctly stated that
"[a]rmed conflict and IHL often require human judgement, common
sense, appreciation of the larger picture, understanding of the
intentions behind people's actions, and understanding of values and
anticipation of the direction in which events are unfolding." 136
As mentioned earlier, there are marked differences between
AWS on the one hand, and remotely operated and automated systems
on the other. Regarding the latter, human input remains a crucial
element. AWS operate in an autonomous manner. Remotely operated
and automated systems retain the possibility to assign individual
responsibility. AWS are built on self-selecting and self-determining
systems, as the "premise underpinning automation is that the
operation of the relevant device is capable of being accurately
predicted based on the programming and commands inputted." 3 7
One of the most important challenges posed by the introduction
of AWS into the modern battle space is how to establish individual
responsibility. Most legal systems require the showing of intent,13 8
with some others adding a requirement of showing individual guilt.
With that in mind, a range of actors should be assessed to determine
whether command responsibility applies. Importantly, the "composite
nature of [lethal autonomous robots] technology and the many levels
likely to be involved in decisions about deployment" could "result in a
potential accountability gap or vacuum."139 In order to avoid what
may also be called a system of organized irresponsibility, it will be
necessary to determine-before or concomitant with further
development, and certainly before any potential deployment-who
can be held responsible under what circumstances. A DoD directive
attempts to avoid organized irresponsibility by requiring that
"[p]ersons who authorize the use of, direct the use of, or operate
autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems must do so with
appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable

135.
See infra note 189 (noting that some measure the potential performance of
AWS against this situation).
136.
Heyns, Special Rapporteur, supra note 25, 1 55.
137.
Stewart, supranote 28, at 290.
138.
See Dan Saxon, Closing the Accountability Gap: Individual Criminal
Responsibility and Autonomous Weapon Systems (forthcoming 2014) (on file with
author); see also Jack M. Beard, Autonomous Weapons and Human Responsibilities, 45
GEO. J. INT'L L. 617, 649 (2014) (detailing that "customary international law"
recognizes a mens rea standard requiring knowledge).
139.
Heyns, Special Rapporteur, supra note 25, 1 77. Others are more sanguine,
contending that even though "a human might not be in control of a particular
engagement does not mean that no human is responsible for the actions of the
autonomous weapon system.. . . A human must decide how to program the system."
Schmitt, Autonomous, supranote 121, at 33.
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treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of
engagement."1 40 While this approach is laudable, it does not clearly
address a fundamental aspect of fully autonomous systems-namely,
that a system's course of action is not necessarily completely
predictable for the operator. If a system is designed in a manner that
is fully predictable, then it is arguably not autonomous as the term is
properly understood and defined by the DoD directive itself.141
Setting aside the very reasonable objection against holding nonhumans responsible, one could try to hold the program or the AWS
itself responsible. At least some commentators foresee this "distant
future once robots become more sophisticated and intelligent."142 In
this context, AWS may be the cause of harm,14 3 yet it is questionable
to attribute blame to an entity that does not possess moral agency.144
For most legal systems, criminal culpability requires some form of
moral agency, which does not exist in the case of AWS.14 5
Additionally, a traditional deterrence rationale does not apply to
AWS. They can neither be punished nor possess any form of moral
agency.14 6 As one author puts it, attempting to impute moral agency

140.
DoD Directive, supra note 28, at 3.
141.
See Spinetta, supra note 18 (recalling the definition of the directive and
noting that the directive limits the use of AWS in a way that that they "may be used to
apply non-lethal, non-kinetic force such as some forms of electronic attack, against
material targets"). It thus echoes earlier statements, pointing out that "[flor a
significant period into the future, the decision to pull the trigger or launch a missile
from an unmanned system will not be fully automated, but it will remain under the full
control of a human operator." FY 2009-2034 UNMANNED SYSTEMS, supranote 5, at 10.
142.
KRISHNAN, supranote 61, at 105.
143.
See, e.g., Alex Eliseev, Army Deaths Investigated; Separate Probes Will
Determine How Nine Soldiers Were Killed in Training, STAR, Oct. 15, 2007 (reporting
the killing of nine South African soldiers by an automated gun in 2007); War of Words
After Army Base Horror,SUNDAY TRIBUNE, Oct. 14, 2007, at 2.
144.
Heyns, Special Rapporteur, supra note 25, [ 76 ("Robots have no moral
agency and as a result cannot be held responsible in any recognizable way if they cause
deprivation of life that would normally require accountability if humans had made the
decisions. Who, then, is to bear the responsibility?"); Sassili, supra note 61, at 324
(opining that commanding autonomous weapons is "a case of direct responsibility" and
that the presence of an autonomous decision-making capactiy does not "break[] the
causal chain allowing attribution and responsibility").
But see Rob Sparrow, Can Machines Be People? Reflections on the Turing
145.
Triage Test, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS
301, 305 (Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & George A. Bekey eds., 2012) [hereinafter
Sparrow, Machines] (stating that "[t]he use of robots in military operations has also
generated a larger ethical debate about the ethics of the development and deployment
of autonomous weapons systems.").
146.
Colin Allen & Wendell Wallach, Moral Machines: Contradictionin Terms or
Abdication of Human Responsibility?, in ROBOT ETHICS, supra note 145, at 55, 62
(stating that some critics "believe that talk of morality is misguided in connection with
agents that lack the potential to choose to act immorally"). But see SAMIR CHOPRA &
LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 11
(2011); Gert-Jan Lokhorst & Jeroen van den Hoven, Responsibility for Military Robots,
in ROBOT ETHICS, supra note 145, at 145, 149 (questioning the stance of other scholars
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to non-humans "offends not only the notion of the rule of law, but also
the more visceral human desire to find an individual accountable." 147
There is also the matter of how to hold AWS accountable. Even if
AWS possessed intellectual abilities-apart from using algorithms to
act in a discretionary manner-it is questionable whether a machine
will ever be able to "suffer" from any form of punishment, whatever
form that may take. One alternative may be to shut off the individual
autonomous weapon system. This does not solve the problem,
however, as what caused the individual system to malfunction would
be prevalent in all AWS based on the same code. But the high cost of
shutting down an entire fleet of AWS based on the same code makes
this somewhat improbable. These considerations illustrate that
holding AWS responsible is a theoretical possibility, but not a useful
or feasible option.
Turning to more realistic attempts to designate responsibility, it
may be possible to hold accountable the scientist or programmer who
developed the software upon which the AWS relied. After all,
software is the ultimate foundation of the AWS's determinations.
Notwithstanding a programmer acting with mens rea, the
programmer's action would have to be negligent. However, holding a
programmer responsible for negligence may be a contentious premise
given a core characteristic of autonomy: if AWS are supposed to act
according to their code and in truly autonomous fashion, they must be
able to make discretionary decisions. It may not be possible to predict
the behavior of the AWS software in all its manifestations given the
changing nature of the battle space.14 8 Any potential AWS
architecture will be complex in nature. The AWS code may have
different origins and react differently than expected in concert, or
may act differently depending on the sensor from which it receives
data. Given this complexity, it may be difficult-although not
impossible-to attribute responsibility to a programmer or a number
of programmers.' 4 9 Responsibility for negligence could only be
established while the system is not designed to learn independently
that robots cannot be made to suffer and surmising that "if robots can be made to
suffer, then they can be punished as well.").
147.
Stewart, supra note 28, at 291; see also Anthony J. Lazarski, Legal
Implicationsof the Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicle, 16 AEROSPACE POWER J., no. 2,
2002, at 74, 81 (stressing the need for accountability).
148.
See ANTHONY FINN & STEVE SCHEDING, DEVELOPMENTS AND CHALLENGES
FOR AUTONOMOUS UNMANNED VEHICLES: A COMPENDIUM 183 (2010) ("[The more
intelligent the decision-making process, the harder it is likely to be to functionally
establish or fully test the response of the system to repeatable or verifiable system
stimuli. How then can an acquisition agency be held responsible for the actions of an
IDT that it cannot fully test?"). In addition, unpredictability may be a desirable asset in
certain circumstances "so as to inject a degree of flexibility or creativity into the
system." Id. at 184.
149.
See Stewart, supra note 28, at 290 ("Neither the programming nor the
command data inputted to these vehicles prior to their deployment on a particular
operation will necessarily result in a specific outcome in response to any given set of
circumstances; this is the essence of autonomy.").
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from past behavior, or in situations where designers acted negligently
in supervising the development of AWS software when it comes to
discretionary decision making. 5 0
Given that AWS are military tools, a natural starting point for
responsibility could be the military officers who set parameters for a
given engagement.' 5 ' It is important to distinguish between direct
responsibility, which arises from acts or omissions supporting the
commission of IHL, and command responsibility, which involves the
failure of military or civilian superiors to conduct the required
oversight of their subordinates.
Traditionally, as long as a system is lawful, "[1]egal responsibility
for any military activity remains with the last person to issue the
command authorising a specific activity."152 This is commensurate
with the existing attribution mechanism by which the officer in
charge is responsible for the aberrant behavior of a weapon system.
This may be the case where a weapon system was set to a specific
target and circumstances were foreseeable at the outset of the
mission. However, this type of situation does not reflect the
characteristics of AWS. A specific advantage of AWS over automated
systems is that targets need not necessarily be preprogrammed, and
the decision-making process is independent and leaves room for
discretion. And so, individuals who set the parameters will be
responsible for reasonably foreseeable violations of law caused by
AWS. But the use of AWS creates a number of complications precisely
because individuals are removed from the decision-making process. It
is likely that soldiers on the front line who deploy AWS will not be
able to fully assess the complexities of the software upon which AWS
are built.15 3 Individuals may then be held accountable for actions that
they had no actual control over, a risk that grows with a higher
degree of autonomy.154
A similar issue arises regarding the mens rea of an operator who
sets in motion an autonomous weapon system. For criminal

Sparrow, Killer Robots, supra note 127, at 70. Sparrow's view in this regard
150.
may be too narrow, as it is possible to attribute negligent behavior for not monitoring
the behavior of an AWS during the learning process.
See Heyns, Special Rapporteur, supra note 25, 1 78 (noting that "[slince a
151.
commander can be held accountable for an autonomous human subordinate, holding a
commander accountable for an autonomous robot subordinate may appear anologous,"
but articulating potential setbacks).
UK DOD JOINT DOCTRINE, supra note 49, T 510.
152.
See Beard, supra note 138, at 652 (noting the complexities involved with
153.
"the more advanced systems on the higher end of the continuum"); Heyns, Special
Rapporteur, supra note 25, 78 ("It will be important to establish, inter alia, whether
military commanders will be in a position to understand the complex programming of
LARs sufficiently well to warrant criminal liablity.")
154.
See Sparrow, Killer Robots, supra note 127, at 71 ("The use of autonomous
weapons . . . involves a risk that military personnel will be held responsible for the
actions of machines whose decisions they did not control.").
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responsibility, the operator must have "intent to commit the crime, or
with an awareness of the probability, in the sense of the substantial
likelihood, that the crime would occur as a consequence of his/her
conduct."15 5 This provides for unique challenges; not only must AWS
"[flunction as anticipated in realistic operational environments
against adaptive adversaries"-and therefore allow a considerable
amount of flexibility-but also "[bje readily understandable to trained
operators."1 56 The necessary "trust" in the capabilities of AWS
therefore is a "complicated and subjective decision, one that requires
a judgment about the capabilities of the system, the circumstances in
which it is to be deployed, and the nature and type of operations in
which the system can be expected to function appropriately." 5 7 The
extent to which this is commensurate with the IHL requirement that
a commander "take all feasible precautions in an attack" is an open
question. Moreover, the deployment of AWS may constitute a war
crime only if the commanding officer possessed the requisite mens rea
at the time. This may occur where the commanding officer sends
AWS into a situation for which they were not designed (i.e., in which
AWS would exceed their capabilities to conform with IHL). In such a
case, proving the commanding officer's responsibility appears legally
unproblematic. However, it is more realistic that not all aspects of a
future mission are known in advance. This type of uncertainty may
make the establishment of mens rea difficult or impossible.
Finally, it may be possible to investigate higher-ranking military
or civilian officials for their action or inaction regarding the testing of
AWS. Under Article 36 AP I, for any weapon, states are under an
obligation "to determine whether its employment would, in some or
all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule
of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party." 5 8
This obligation applies during the "study, development, acquisition or
adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare." 5 9 The
provision aims to "prevent the use of weapons that would violate
international law" and to "impose restrictions on the use of weapons
that would violate international law in some circumstances, by
determining their lawfulness before they are developed, acquired or
otherwise incorporated into a State's arsenal."160 There is little state
practice as to the precise ramifications of this provision.161 The

155.
Saxon, supra note 138, at 16.
156.
DoD Directive, supranote 28, at 2.
157.
Beard, supra note 138, at 653.
158.
AP I, supranote 52, art. 36.
159.
Id.
160.
Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Means
and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of
1977, 88 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 931, 933 (2006) [hereinafter ICRC, Guide].
161.
See James D. Fry, Contextualized Legal Reviews for the Methods and Means
of Warfare: Cave Combat and International Humanitarian Law, 44 COLUM. J.
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provision largely allows states to decide how they analyze "whether
the employment of a weapon for its normal or expected use would be
162
While there has been
prohibited under some or all circumstances."
163
the extent to
rigorous debate about the meaning of this provision,
64
which states comply with it is not clear.1 Given the highly sensitive
nature of AWS technology, it is to be expected that such a review
16 5
would not be public, but rather conducted in secret.
Under international criminal law, command responsibility is
predicated on the establishment of conduct, by a subordinate, which
amounts to a criminal act. But command responsibility only attaches
in situations where the commander knew or should have known
about the crime, was in a position to prevent it, and had a
commensurate duty to do SO.1 6 6 The threshold for civilian superiors
differs slightly in that it requires knowledge or the conscious
disregard of information that "clearly indicated that the subordinates
167
Given the high
were committing or about to commit such crimes."
degree of complexity in decision-making processes of AWS, one
suggestion consists of "military organizations putting clear rules and
regulations in place to govern the employment of autonomous
68
weapons in specific types of operations."1 Absent such regulation,
TRANSNAT'L L. 453, 473 (2006) (noting only "a few states" are known to perform Article
1470 (pointing out that states are not
36 reviews); cf. PILLOUD, supra note 79,
obligated to publicize their review findings).
PILLOUD, supra note 79, at 424. The 2006 review by the International
162.
Committee of the Red Cross provides some guidance in this regard. See ICRC, Guide,
supra note 160, at 20-28 (2006).
Cf. Isabelle Daoust, Robin Coupland & Rikke Ishoey, New Wars, New
163.
Weapons? The Obligation of States to Assess the Legality of Means and Methods of
Warfare, 84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 345, 352-54 (2002) (asserting that states should
take a more rigorous and multidisciplinary approach to the review process); Justin
McClelland, The Review of Weapons in Accordance with Article 36 of Additional
Protocol I, 85 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 397, 414 (2003) (criticizing the idea that a
centralized review agency could adequately implement Article 36).
Cf. Marie Jacobsson, Modern Weaponry and Warfare: The Application of
164.
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I by Governments, in THE LAW OF WAR IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: WEAPONRY AND THE USE OF FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES 183,
184-85 (Anthony M. Helm ed., vol. 82, 2007).
BOOTHBY, supra note 94, at 343 (referring to the "strong military and
165.
security reasons" for keeping such review secret from potential enemies).
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 28(2)(a), July 17,
166.
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, 106 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]
(establishing conditions for the criminal responsibility of military commanders for the
actions of forces under their command). See generally Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal
Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 159 (2007). For the
different evidentiary requirements under the jurisprudence of the ad-hoc tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda on the one hand and the International Criminal
Court on the other, see Saxon, supra note 138, at 19--25 (noting that, generally
speaking, the ICC superior responsibility standard is more difficult to meet because the
prosecution must prove, in addition to elements similar to those under the ad hoc
tribunals, "that the superior's omission increased the risk of the commission of the
crimes charged").
Rome Statute, supra note 166.
167.
Beard, supra note 138, at 659.
168.
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establishing a sufficient degree of knowledge regarding the "misuse of
complex autonomous weapon systems" may make it difficult or
impossible to "justify the imposition of criminal liability for [the
commander's] failure to prevent or suppress violations of the IHL
framework."1 69 The DoD directive provides only scant guidance, as
there is unclear meaning of the term appropriate care when
authorizing, directing, or operating the deployment of AWS.o7 0 While
attaching responsibility to the commanders may be possible, it may
be elusive in reality and thus adds to the challenges in establishing
individual responsibility. Finally, liability could attach to the
individual that conducted the review pursuant to Article 36 AP I.
Absent evidence of intentional or negligent approval of deficient
AWS, no criminal liability would arise. 171
Another way of attaching responsibility may be to make the
decisions within AWS traceable, thereby creating a path of
accountability for each individual action taken by an autonomous
weapon system. Proponents of this approach contend that auditability
can be programmed into AWS so that every distinct decision can be
traced back to the responsible individual, who may then be held
accountable.1 72 At this time, the extent to which this is possible is an
open question, as the requisite mens rea may be difficult to prove. 7 8
A UK report shows the existing ambiguity when the report first
states that "situations can arise where it is unclear whether the legal
liability for inappropriate weapon release lies with the pilot, the
design authority or the regulatory authority" but bases this on the
assumption that "the logic of the current manned process is
maintained."' 7 4 As discussed previously, AWS follow a different

169.

Id.

170.
See DoD Directive, supra note 28, at 3 (requiring those who operate AWS
technology to exercise "appropriate care" and follow "the law of war, applicable treaties,
weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement (ROE)").
171.
Id.
172.
See, e.g., Heyns, Special Rapporteur, supra note 25, 81 (recommending
the installation of recording devices into AWS, as well as the mandatory review of
footage in cases of "lethal use"); Saxon, supra note 138, at 26-27 (suggesting that "subsystem[s] of electronic recording" integrated into AWS technology "might focus the
minds of field commanders so as to avoid criminal conduct"). One such example may be
found in the so-called Keel-Technology. See FOR THOSE WHO WANT TO LEAD RATHER
THAN FOLLOW: KEEL TECHNOLOGY FOR COMPLEX PROBLEMS, http://www.compsim.com

(last visited Sept. 28, 2014) [http://perma.cc/D3QC-M5A9] (archived Sept. 28, 2014)
(advertising software "for putting human-like reasoning into devices and/or software
applications").
173.
See Saxon, supra note 138, at 3 (asserting that this difficulty becomes
particularly acute "[o]nce the speed of autonomous technology reaches levels that
preclude effective human supervision and control").
174.

UK DOD JOINT DOCTRINE, supra note 49,

510.
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process with a considerably lower degree of predictability as to the
behavior of the system.' 7 5
Relatedly, how to differentiate and assign responsibility in the
multilevel system that AWS represents is unclear. All of these
questions await answers at this time. The biggest worry is not that
AWS may malfunction at some point, as one inevitably will, but
rather to what extent the development of AWS can avoid a system of
organized irresponsibility that shuffles responsibility from one actor
to another without holding anyone accountable in the end.
IV. ETHICAL CHALLENGES TO AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS

Apart from the legal questions addressed in Part III, a set of
related issues arises from ethical concerns. From its inception, the
purpose of IHL was to make armed conflict more humane. That
chivalristic notion may never have been realized to a desirable extent.
However, discussions about AWS raise ethical questions that attempt
to resolve or at least thoroughly debate the implications of deploying
this new technology.176
Two relatively recent events that spurred ethical questions were
the bombing campaigns in the Balkans in the 1990s and in Iraq in
the first decade of the twenty-first century.' 7 7 While ground forces
followed the bombing campaign in Iraq, both conflicts are
characterized by a considerable reluctance to deploy soldiers in
ground operations. This was especially true with respect to Kosovo. In
that situation, a bombing campaign against Serbia and Serbian forces
in Kosovo over a few months led to the end of the conflict. The option
of conducting operations "surgically," purportedly with a high degree
of precision, was much more attractive for decision makers than the
messy and much more dangerous action of committing ground troops.
As a consequence, the operation was entirely carried out by airplanes
and cruise missiles, removing attacking soldiers from harm to a
considerable extent. AWS will remove humans further from the battle

The report recognizes this in the paragraph immediately preceding the
175.
quoted text, stating that "[iun reality, predictability is likely to be inversely
proportional to mission and environmental complexity." Id.
See, e.g., Convention on Conventional Weapons, Draft Report of the 2014
176.
Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, May 13-16, 2014, 22,
www.delegfrance-cd-geneve.org/IMG/docReportDraft-format4.doc
at
available
[http://perma.cc/L44W-C3C2] (archived Sept. 28, 2014) (stating that "[a] significant
number of interventions stressed the fact that the possibility for a robotic system to
acquire capacities of 'moral reasoning' and 'judgment' was highly questionable.").
A similar situation arose in the attacks on Libyan military forces loyal to
177.
the government of Col. Qaddafi where allied forces inserted no ground troops of their
own but launched a heavy bombing campaign that greatly weakened the Libyan
military. David D. Kirkpatrick, Steven Patrick & Elisabeth Bumiller, Allies Open Air
Assault on Qaddafi'sForces in Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2011, at Al.

1410

VANDERBILT]OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 47-1371

space. The deployment of AWS will no longer necessitate sending
pilots on bombing campaigns to the same extent as was the case (e.g.
in Kosovo) and thus putting one's own troops at risk. It will also no
longer be necessary to employ a "pilot" for a particular drone or set of
drones. Rather, AWS will operate according to their foundational
code. As outlined above, the responsibility therefore shifts: to the
software engineer or those who advise software engineers; to the
testing units; to those overseeing a particular tactical situation; to the
military commanders; or to the political leadership.
Ronald Arkin, one of the most vocal proponents of this shift
toward autonomy suggests that such a development is beneficial from
an ethical perspective: "This effort has an overarching goal of
producing an 'artificial conscience,' to yield a new class of robots
termed Humane-oids-robots that can potentially perform more
ethically in the battlefield than humans are capable of doing."1 78
A. Dehumanization Through Removal of Individual from the
Battlefield?
Increasing distance and separation from actions contributes to
the dehumanization of killing, a dehumanization that may already
occur through the use of remotely operated drones.1 79 One common
example is the firebombing that took place during World War II. The
physical distance, and technical aspect of their tasks, removed pilots
to an extent that enabled them to carry out their missions-with
closer proximity to the battlefield, they might not have carried them
out. 180 As distance increases, it becomes psychologically easier for
individuals to commit acts that they would often otherwise be more
reluctant to carry out. 181 Humans, some have claimed, have an innate
reluctance to kill one another.182 While the extent to which that is
true might be debated, that reluctance has been circumvented by the
physical and psychological distance brought about by long-range
weapon systems. Similarly, the direct impacts of an individual's
actions are decreasingly visible due to the technological nature of
today's combat operations.' 8 3 Advantages associated with the use of

178.
ARKIN, supranote 30, at xvi.
179.
See SINGER, WIRED, supra note 3, at 395-96 (quoting, inter alia, an army
chaplain's concerns that 'as war becomes safer and easier, as soldiers are removed
from the horrors of war and see the enemy not as humans but as blips on a screen,
there is a very real danger of losing the deterrent that such horrors provide').
180.
Id.
181.
DAVE GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING TO
KILL IN WAR AND SOCIETY 97-137 (1st ed. 1995) (discussing numerous anecdotes of
killing at various ranges).
182.
Id.
183.
Id. at 107-10 (noting the importance of factors such as group absolution,
mechanical distance, and physical distance, in reducing the emotional impact of
killing); Lokhorst & van den Hoven, supra note 146, at 147-48 (stating that when it
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AWS include lowering the number of human casualties in war by
84
placing robots in harm's way instead of human beings,1 decreasing
the destruction associated with armed conflict through potentially
more precise machines, and reducing the accidental targeting of
civilians or other non-combatants if the machine is powerful and
sophisticated enough to make accurate determinations. Human error
is often the cause of accidentally engaging friendly forces or civilians,
so removing the human element from the equation could be
potentially beneficial. However, problems have been reported in the
use of the current generation of UAVs. Because individuals no longer
fight on the battlefield and are stationed close to home, it is
85
psychologically difficult to separate between these spaces.1 One can
no longer leave an experience behind through the distance covered by
traveling home.
AWS push this paradigm change even further. While the
physical distance may not be greater, the psychological distance no
longer plays a significant role. Though human operators may oversee
their actions, the very essence of AWS is the ability to make decisions
without direct human input and act independently. However, not all
human participation is eliminated. In a more removed manner,
individuals remain a part of the decision-making loop. The decision
makers controlling the parameters of the software essentially
determine the operation of AWS-although in an ex ante fashion and
not in real time, leaving it to the software to make determinations in
real time. These individuals could be far removed from the battle
space in which AWS are deployed, potentially broadening the scope of
those typically considered to be eligible targets in an armed conflict.
To what extent the desire to protect human life remains
sufficiently robust to avoid reducing historic gains in international
was discovered in the wake of World War II that less than 20% of soldiers actually fired
at the enemy, Army doctrine began to place more emphasis on bombings and artillery);
Noel Sharkey, Killing Made Easy: From Joysticks to Politics, in ROBOT ETHICS, supra
note 145, at 111, 111-12 (referring to Grossman's book, and recounting similarly low
hit rates in World War I and conflicts in the nineteenth century); MARTIN & SASSER,
supra note 37, at 43-44. Once the target was acquired, the author claims that the
enemy "was so far away and only a high-tech image on a computer screen. The moral
aspects of it-that I was about to assassinate a fellow human being from ambushdidn't factor in. Not at the moment. Not yet." Id. Furthermore, the authors contend
that there is a gap between the reality of war and the war that the operator was
participating in from across the world: "The ability to kill people from such great
distances, playing God, widened the gap between the reality of war and our perception
of it. It was almost like watching an NFL game on TV with its tiny figures on the
screen compared to being down there on the field in the mud and the blood in the rain
getting your socks knocked off." Id. at 46-47.
Billitteri, supra note 21, at 662 (referring to a statement by Edward
184.
Barrett, director of research at the U.S. Naval Academy's Stockdale Center for Ethical
Leadership, claiming that the technology must be used as it is more humane).
Cf. Jean L. Otto & Bryant J. Webber, Mental Health Diagnoses and
185.
CounselingAmong Pilots of Remotely PilotedAircraft in the United States Air Force, 20
MED. SURVEILLANCE MONTHLY REP. 3, 5-7 (2013) (noting that the mental health of
remote pilots is no worse than that of traditional pilots).
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humanitarian law remains to be seen. It is possible that
humanitarian concerns could become significantly less important, as
the adoption of AWS-over time and in an incremental manner-may
endanger fewer soldiers and prevent loss of life, especially in the
developed states able to afford this technology.
Some AWS proponents also claim that, when working with
humans, AWS may have the ability to reduce unethical behavior by
humans through reporting mechanisms. 186 They could be
programmed to "independently and objectively monitor ethical
behavior in the battlefield by all parties and report" observed
infractions.' 8 7 Even their presence alone is expected by some to "lead
to a reduction in human ethical infractions."188
B. Ethical Robots?
There are various arguments for increasing the use of AWS so as
to increase ethical behavior on the battlefield.189 Unlike humans,
AWS do not have a need to protect themselves. Because AWS are
emotionless, cannot hate, cannot fear, cannot be hungry or tired, and
have no survival instinct, nothing can "cloud their judgment."19 0
Walzer made a related observation, namely that "[flear and hysteria
are always latent in combat, often real, and they press us toward
fearful measures [.]"191

Proponents argue that the use of AWS would remove the human
psychological element of "scenario fulfillment." This element is
believed to have contributed to the downing of Flight 655 by the USS

186.
See, e.g., ARKIN, supra note 30, at 29-30.
187.
Id. at 32.
188,
Id.
189.
See, e.g., id. at 29-30 (suggesting automous robots, more so than humans,
are able to react quickly and more conservatively to a threat, can be better equipped,
can avoid emotional judgments and cognitive biases, and can monitor human soldiers
objectively); Quintana, supra note 39, at 13 (agreeing with Arkin, but suggesting a
more comprehensive consequentialist "morality test"); Lokhorst & van den Hoven,
supra note 146, at 148 (arguing that robots are capable of more ethical behavior
because they can act to incapacitate the enemy in situations where human soldiers
would have no choice but to kill); Beard, supra note 30, at 428-42 (arguing that the
"virtual distance" created by AWS technology encourages proportional responses by
"eliminating some of the key excuses that states have long used to escape responsibility
for attacks that appear to cause excessive civilian casualties," such as the risks to
human soldiers and uncertainties inherent in combat situations, or the limits of human
senses or information-gathering abilities). For similar arguments, see Marchant, supra
note 10, at 281-89 (discussing some of the advantages of lethal autonomous robots, but
acknowledging that the the ethical issues surrounding warfare are such that "a full
awareness of the risks from autonomous robots may be impossible").
190.
ARKIN, supranote 30, at 29.
191.
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 251 (1977).
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Vincennes in 1988.192 Scenario fulfillment is a form of premature
cognitive closure that leads to distortion or neglect of incoming
information that contradicts preexisting belief patterns in stressful
situations.1 9 3 The official DoD report on the incident finds that
"[s]tress, task fixation, and unconscious distortion of data may have
played a major role in this incident" and that the personnel "became
convinced [that] track 4131 was an Iranian F-14" rather than a
civilian aircraft. 194 Based on this information, the operator "appears
to have distorted data flow in an unconscious attempt to make
available evidence fit a preconceived scenario."1 95 On the basis of the
AWS design, proponents argue that the system would not be
vulnerable to such patterns of behavior; without the distortions
stemming from scenario fulfillment, they are better capable of
handling situations in which new information may be contradictory to
previous information.1 96 After all, in the Flight 655 case, one could
imagine an autonomous ship-to-air missile with the capacity to
differentiate fighter aircraft from a large commercial airplane, given
the differences in physical characteristics, particularly size, so that it
could abort the attack, even at the last moment.
Another argument in favor of AWS is that they will have the
ability to observe a large number of relevant aspects due to their
superior sensor abilities. For example, today's UAVs have a much
longer "loitering time" of up to forty hours over a particular area.
Even if they cannot observe everything, their abilities are certainly
greater than those of their human counterparts with respect to data
absorption and data analysis. 19 7 Data arise from multiple remote

See Scott Sagan, Rules of Engagement, in AVOIDING WAR: PROBLEMS OF
192.
CRISIS MANAGEMENT 443, 460 (Alexander L. George ed., 1991) (describing how
personnel aboard the Vincennes incorrectly interpreted Flight 655 as descending to
attack after instruments briefly identified the plane as a military aircraft); see also
Quintana, supra note 39, at 13 (agreeing with Arkin that autonomous robots can avoid
"scenario fulfullment" reasoning).
The action that led to the attack on the aircraft was furthermore attributed
193.
to (a) confusion because of the proximity of military aircraft despite the civilian aircraft
having engaged its civilian transponders, and (b) a permissive interpretation of the
rules of engagement, possibly influenced by an attack on a U.S. ship one year earlier,
also in the Persian Gulf. Sagan, supra note 192, at 460-61 (noting that other
commanders in the vicinity did not identify the aircraft as hostile, despite operating
under the same rules of engagement, because they had correct transponder and
altitude information).
194.
DEP'T OF DEF., FORMAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE DOWNING OF IRAN AIR FLIGHT 655 ON JULY 3, 1988, at 63 (1988).
195.
Id.
See RONALD C. ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR: EMBEDDING ETHICS
196.
IN A HYBRID DELIBERATIVE/REACTIVE ROBOT ARCHITECTURE 6-7 (2011), available at
http://www.cc.gatech.edu/ai/robot-lab/online-publications/formalizationv35.pdf
[http://perma.cc/937B-YYY3 ] (archived Sept. 22, 2014) ("Robots need not be vulnerable
to such patterns of [scenario fulfillment] behavior.").
Cf. Thom Shanker & Matt Richtel, In New Military, Data Overload Can Be
197.
Deadly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at Al (recounting serious oversights resulting from
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sensors and intelligence-including humans-as part of modern
network-centric warfare concepts, as well as the concurrent
development of far-reaching information grids.198 This development
can be expected to continue, summed up by one commentator:
"military systems (including weapons) now on the horizon will be too
fast, too small, too numerous, and will create environments too
complex for humans to direct."' 9 9
There remains a crucial question in the debate over the
development and future deployment of AWS. Is it possible to devise
AWS that would be responsive to the requirements of IHL,
underlying ethical considerations, and the highly complex battle
spaces of today? The answer is vigorously debated. Arkin suggests the
creation of an "ethical governor." 200 This piece of software would
determine whether a particular action by an autonomous weapon
system would be unethical, and if so, alert a human operator or
constrain the action that would otherwise have been carried out.201
The ethical governor would "not involve emotion directly . .. as that

has been shown to impede the ethical judgment of humans in
wartime." 202 Rather, it would introduce an element, akin to guilt,
which can be re-programmed-over time and not in specific
situations-after a proper assessment of the system's behavior has
been carried out. 203 At the initial stage, however, the role of emotions
(and with it, the attribution of intentions to an action-i.e., are the
children running toward a group of soldiers with what looks like a
weapon truly a threat or are they chasing a soccer ball?) is
diminished. The ethical governor evaluates the available options,
with the guilt censor rejecting certain action as it sees fit. 204
There are a number of principled objections against this view,
one of which is recognized by Arkin himself. Arkin realizes that IHL
requires a certain level of compassion, which is difficult to build into
AWS. 205 To address this deficiency, he believes that abiding by the
other rules of IHL creates a thick enough web of rules to establish the
requisite level of compassion. However, as was shown above, the
soldiers being unable to adequately monitor all of the information sources available to
them).
198.
See generally DEF. ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, STO BAA 0752, SCALABLE NETWORK MONITORING (2007), available at https://www.fbo.gov/index?s
=opportunity&mode=form&tab=core&id=b524ff8d8f7390061d4c5d5444c9e620&tab=do
cuments&tabmode=list (soliciting proposals for, inter alia, novel network traffic
monitoring approaches to protect Defense Department computers).
199.
Thomas K. Adams, Future Warfare and the Decline of Human
Decisionmaking, 31 PARAMETERS 57, 58 (2001).
200.
ARKIN, supra note 30, at 127-33.
201.
Id. at 122-23 (providing sample decision-making "architecture" for this
purpose).
202.
Id. at 118.
203.
Id. at 125, 138-43.
204.
Id. at 140.
205.
Id. at 143.
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widespread use of proportionality throughout IHL begs the question
why these other rules exist at all if they are indeed capable of
creating the web that Arkin presumes to exist.
Furthermore, while one can argue whether human problem
solving in a socially complex situation should serve as a model for
AWS design, experiments involving certain brain functions show
human emotion to be an important element in the process of human
decision making. 20 6 There is little doubt that human emotions have
led to some horrific results in armed conflict. 207 But at the same time,
emotions can play a positive role, namely through the ability to
empathize.2 08 In that sense, emotions play a constructive and decisive
role in determining which option an individual will actually take at a
given moment. For example, consider experiments with individuals
that lack certain brain functions associated with emotions. The
absence of these functions, associated with damage in the prefrontal
cortex, would in those situations most likely lead to disastrous
results. In the situation described above, a non-empathizing soldier
may open fire, while a fully functional individual may have the
cognitive ability and empathetic reaction to hold fire. Under Arkin's
model, the AWS decision-making process would lead it to a particular
course of action that may involve the use of force. But the model
underlying the ethical governor is designed to block and prevent
damaging behavior from occurring in this situation. The problem
then becomes much clearer: the underlying assumption is that
emotions do not play a role in the initial filtering process of what
options are being considered. 209 Arguments that "[e]motionless robots

See Marcello Guarini & Paul Bello, Robotic Warfare: Some Challenges in
206.
Moving from Noncivilian to Civilian Theaters, in ROBOT ETHICS, supra note 145, at
129, 135-39 (citing studies from "a growing body of literature in cognitive science
regarding the importance of emotions to decision making"); Susan A. Bandes, Is it
Immoral to Punish the Heedless and Clueless? A Comment on Alexander, Ferzan, and
Morse: Crime and Culpability, 29 LAW & PHIL. 433, 439-46 (2010). Bandes generally
discusses the role of the subconscious and unconscious in human beings. Bandes
argues that there is no sharp divide between the two and that our ability to exercise
control over conscious decisions is largely a myth and most decision making comes from
the subconscious. See id. at 440 ("There is increasing evidence, in fact, that very little
of our information-processing and decision-making takes place on what is commonly
called a 'conscious' level."). "Our conscious reasons are often post-hoc explanations
rather than reflections of an actual process." Id. at 445.
See, e.g., Sass6li, supra note 61, at 310; Schmitt, Autonomous, supra note
207.
121, at 13.
It is also worth pointing out that military training has over time been
208.
conducted to reduce the amount of time that compassion can even play a role. See
Lokhorst & van den Hoven, supra note 146, at 147 (referring to changes the U.S. Army
made to its training regimen after World War II in order to make firing at human
targets a reflexive action).
See Guarini & Bello, supra note 206, at 136 (suggesting that this
209.
assumption is incorrect and that "a robot without representation of or the ability to
recognize these emotional states would be at a crippling disadvantage in the
battlefield").
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could . . . serve as tools of repressive dictators seeking to crack down

on their own people without fear their troops would turn on them" 2 10
lend themselves to criticism. 211 Whether dictators will find a pliable
force to quash dissent is less important than AWS being programmed
to replicate emotions that are desirable within the IHL frameworksuch as compassion when the situation warrants it-while leaving
out those emotions that lead to disastrous consequences. 21 2
What should the benchmark for ethical behavior be in the first
place? Arkin and others argue that AWS would be able to do the same
tasks as humans in a more ethical manner. This argument relies
partially on a recent (and somewhat disturbing) report published by
the Surgeon General's Office in 2006 that supports the idea that
unmanned combat systems may undoubtedly play a vital role in
enforcing many of the ethical challenges that occur during combat. 213
According to the report, appropriate ethical behavior among soldiers
and marines deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation
Enduring Freedom was questionable, despite a large number of
soldiers and marines reporting that they received adequate
training. 214 Some of the findings include: 215
1. Approximately 10 percent of Soldiers and Marines report
mistreating noncombatants such as, purposely damaging or
destroying civilian property when not necessary or
hit/kicked a noncombatant when not necessary.

210.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 4.
211.
See Schmitt, Autonomous, supra note 121, at 13.
212.
For a situation in which a similar visceral reaction is used during combat,
see U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 7-21.13, THE SOLDIER'S GUIDE 1-29 to 1-31
(2004), available at http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR-ubs/DR-alpdf/fm7-21x13.pdf
[http://perma.cc/D5ZH-FDMU] (archived Sept. 28, 2014) (describing the ethical
reasoning process the Army expects unit leaders to follow, and providing an example
ethical dilemma involving a possible checkpoint bombing).
213.
See ARKIN, supra note 30, at 31-32; SINGER, WIRED, supra note 3, at 401
(citing a 2007 report by the U.S. Army which concluded that lethal robots could
potentially be more ethical and consistent on the battlefield than human soldiers). On
the question to what extent it is possible to reduce ethics to logically consistent
principles, see generally WENDELL WALLACH & COLIN ALLEN, MORAL MACHINES:
TEACHING ROBOTS RIGHT FROM WRONG 2-4 (2009), available at http://dx.doi.org/
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195374049.001.0001
[http://perma.cc/Q6NC-EBJ3]
(archived
Sept. 22, 2014) (discussing the possibility of "machine ethics" and seeking to place
recent developments in that area in a broader philosophical context).
214.
OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., MENTAL HEALTH ADVISORY TEAM (MHAT)
IV: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 05-07, FINAL REPORT 37 (2006) (providing statistical
evidence of soldiers' and marines' perceptions of battlefield ethical violations).
Disturbingly, a large percentage of soldiers and marines reported that their noncommissioned officers and officers in their own unit did not make it clear that
mistreatment was impermissible, with 33 percent of marines and 29 percent of soldiers
responding in such a manner, respectively.
215.
Id. at 34-41.
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2. Only 47 percent of Soldiers and 38 percent of Marines agreed that
noncombatants should be treated with dignity and respect.
3. Over one-third of Soldiers and Marines reported torture should be
allowed in order to save the life of a fellow Soldier or Marine
or to obtain important information pertaining to the enemy.
4. 45 percent of Soldiers and 60 percent of Marines did not agree
that they would report a fellow Soldier or Marine if he had
injured or killed an innocent noncombatant.
5. Only 43 percent of Soldiers and 30 percent of Marines agreed that
they would report a unit member for unnecessarily
damaging or destroying private property.
6. Less than one-half of Soldiers and Marines would report a team
member for several forms of unethical behavior.
7. 28 percent of Soldiers and 31 percent of Marines reported ethical
dilemmas in which they did not know how to respond.
8. Immediate loss of a fellow Soldier or Marine during extreme
violence was associated with an increase in ethical
violations.
Assuming it is possible to design AWS that exceed the statistics
in these findings, some argue that it would be unethical not to employ
AWS that behave better than the soldiers that display such
behavior. 2 16 One need not be a philosopher to understand the
consequentialist or utilitarian argument implicit here. One need not
be a deontologist in order to at least raise some issues with this
approach. There is a difference between ex post facto admissions by
individuals to having committed what could amount to war crimes,
and a built-in a priorifailure rate that may lead to the commission of
war crimes. The former could potentially be remedied through better

216.
See, e.g., ARKIN, supra note 30, at 33-36; George R. Lucas, Legal and
Ethical Precepts Governing Emerging Military Technologies: Research and Use, 2013
UTAH L. REV. 1271, 1279 (2013) (arguing that the use of autonomous unmanned
systems is morally obligatory if they can (1) minimize risks to human soldiers; (2)
distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, and respond to threat
proportionally; and (3) respect the laws of war and rules of engagement equally as well
as humans do). In a similar vein, see Lokhorst & van den Hoven, supra note 146, at
154-55 ("From a moral point of view, the design of military robots is eminently
desirable, provided that such robots are designed as transparent robots that avoid
killing to the maximum extent possible, and not as inscrutable killer robots, over which
we have no control."); Hauptman, supra note 28, at 192-95 (preferring regulation of
AWS technology, because "a prohibition on autonomous weapons systems is unrealistic,
and this unrealistic ban would disillusion many actors from compliance with
international weapons laws completely"); Sass6li, supra note 61, at 310, 320; Schmitt,
Autonomous, supra note 121, at 25.
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education prior to sending individuals into combat. Furthermore,
states are under an obligation to prevent or-in the alternativeprosecute war crimes, making it possible to retroactively punish
offenders. Such criminal sanctions may serve as a deterrent for at
least some.
In addition, this approach moves the question to an earlier
moment in the design process without actually solving it. In order to
determine whether an ethically problematic situation even takes
place, an AWS would have to be cognizant of the ethical implications
of its actions. It would have to be able to compare the ethical
implications of various courses of actions and decide which is more
appropriate. The dilemma thus consists of the ethical governor not
being able to recognize ethically problematic situations in the first
place. 217 Such a calculation may be impossible in the time period
available for AWS. Or, because of the short time frame, AWS may use
only insufficient information to take action.2 18
The discussion then returns to whether it is possible to punish
AWS, as punishment requires moral agency. 219 Some researchers
claim that the deliberative system-oftentimes overlaid by an
instinctual decision-making system-is what makes humans moral
agents. The ability to cognitively assess a situation allows for
"structur[ing] alternative possible futures as mental representations,
and then to choose our actions based on which of the representations
that we wish to become our experienced reality."22 0 Furthermore,
some argue that the development of such a deliberative system is a
requirement for moral personhood, and that the "key to moral
responsibility and personhood is the possession of moral agency." 221

V. POLITICAL CHALLENGES TO AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS

There are also political challenges to the development and use of
AWS. The core political argument is that AWS could make it less
politically costly for the leadership of a country to engage in, or
prolong, armed conflict, due to decreased human sacrifice.

217.
See Sparrow, Machines, supra note 145, at 301, 304-05.
218.
Cf. Keith Abney, Robotics, Ethical Theory, and Metaethics:A Guide for the
Perplexed, in ROBOT ETHICS, supra note 145, at 35, 43 (alluding to the works of Isaac
Asimov in describing how robots' rule-based decisionmaking can lead to unintended
results).
219.
Cf. Allen & Wallach, supra note 146, at 62 (referring to the Kantian view
that morality only has meaning to the extent one could have chosen to act immorally,
but did not).
220.
Abney, supra note 218, at 47.
221.
Id. See also the contribution of Allen and Wallach in the same volume, for
example, Allen & Wallach, supra note 146, at 43 (referring to same point of view
described in footnote 212).
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Though it is counterintuitive, one could also argue that the
decision to employ more sophisticated technology carries with it a
higher burden for political decision makers.22 2 As Stewart puts it:
the perverse effect for States and the senior civilian and military
command echelon who promote the development and implementation of
new technology as a means of 'casualty free' warfare is that they may
well find themselves with nobody to stand between the actions of such
223
autonomous systems and themselves when things go wrong.

Even with incremental steps toward autonomy, the intriguing
notion of casualty free warfare does not appear realistic in the near
future. Human soldiers may fight alongside AWS, and their numbers
may decrease relatively speaking, but an army of "robots" conducting
all or even a large majority of fighting in an armed conflict is-at
least at this point-not likely.
One of the dangers in relying on autonomous systems is the
perception that may be created for those who would otherwise have to
fight in conflicts of low or no risk. AWS therefore have the potential
to lower the costs for political decision makers to engage in armed
conflict. 224 This is not a matter for IHL, but it potentially reduces
compliance with the jus ad bello requirements. 225 The political
calculus would not have to take into account the number of fallen
soldiers. Historically, IHL has been an anthropocentric endeavor to
provide a legal framework for the inevitable human suffering during
armed conflict, attempting to make it at least somewhat more
humane. Taking individuals out of the equation by relying on
computer software-no longer retaining individuals "in the loop" or
"on the loop"-increases the potential for states to resort to force, to
continue or even to escalate a conflict, as their citizens or at least a
smaller proportion thereof are no longer directly placed at risk.
This development has been going on in connection with armed
conflicts through different strategies that have been employed, or

222.
Stewart, supra note 28, at 291 (arguing that the use of AWS will take some
attention off the warzone itself and "focus greater attention on civilian leadership and
military commanders at the operational or strategic level for the actions of autonomous
systems").
223.
Id. at 293.
224.
Cf. Sarah Kreps & John Kaag, The Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in
Contemporary Conflict: A Legal and Ethical Analysis, 44 POLITY 260, 281-82 (2012)
(citing the possibility that military commanders may come to see war as essentially a
business, and that reduced troop losses due to the use of AWS may lead to greater
acceptance of longer wars); Frank Sauer & Niklas Schbrnig, Killer Drones: The 'Silver
Bullet' of Democratic Warfare?, 43 SEcURITY DIALOGUE 363, 370 (2012) (arguing that
democracies are eager to use drones because they allow the transfer of many of the
risks of war to the enemy but are only one step in "'the quest for bloodless war');
Singer, Drones, supra note 17, at SR5.
225.
This is even conceded by some who are otherwise generally favorably
inclined towards AWS. See, e.g., Sass6li, supra note 61, at 315 (acknowledging the
problem, but also asserting that the risk of such technology encouraging "easier" wars
is mitigated somewhat because they cannot yet be fought entirely by robots).
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reemployed, in the last quarter century. An example is the increased
reliance of developed states on bombing campaigns in the late
twentieth century (e.g., the prolonged NATO bombing campaigns in
the Balkans in the 1990s, the U.S.IUK bombing campaigns against
Iraq in 1990-91, or the bombing campaign against Libya in 2011). The
relatively lower risk to armed forces made the decision to engage in
conflict politically more palatable to the wider public and less risky
for the politicians involved. 226
The reduced political price if casualties to one's military
personnel can be avoided is likely to become an even larger
consideration subsequent to the deployment of AWS in armed
conflict. At least in democracies, the loss of human life-especially
the lives of fellow citizens-is a fundamental impediment to either
engaging in or maintaining armed conflict. Casualties are a
significant reason why armed conflicts are not more common. Sending
an army of machines to war-rather than friends and relatives-does
not exact the same physical and emotional toll on a population. This
lowered cost may reduce the rigor with which states pursue
nonviolent alternatives, thus encouraging armed conflict that may
not have arisen without the option of deploying AWS and therefore
avoiding the political costs that come with wartime casualties.
Some authors object to this line of argument by raising a "moral
counter-objection," claiming that not operating AWS would deny
protections to civilians and soldiers that would otherwise be available
due to their more precise nature. 227 Whether this amounts to socalled "moral hostage-taking" 228 is uncertain. It is also not clear that
the moral counter-objection addresses the argument to the extent its
proponents claim. The starting point for the counterargument is the

226.
A second development was the use of private military contractors and/or
mercenaries in lieu of a state's own armed forces. The full or partial replacement of a
country's own soldiers with contractors from the same or different nationalities was
due, in some instances, to economic considerations. The replacement was also due to
the decrease in political costs that results when a state no longer needs to consider if a
sufficient number of its military personnel did not return. See generally LAURA A.
DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR & PEACE: PRESERVING PUBLIC VALUES IN A WORLD OF
PRIVATIZED FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2011) (examining the use of military contractors by the
United States); PETER W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED

MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003) (describing the rise of privatized warfare and accompanying
practical, ethical, management, and national security implications); Markus Wagner,
The Second Largest Force: Private Military Contractors & State Responsibility (Miami
Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2010-10, 2010), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract~id=1588240 [http/perma.cc/3SCC-2CJL] (archived Sept. 22, 2014)
(discussing the history and definition of non-state military forces, state responsibility
for their actions, and costs and benefits of their use).
227.
Anderson & Waxman, supra note 9, at 13; cf. Lin, Bekey & Abney, supra
note 33, at 57 (pointing out that the argument that autonomous robots should be
banned because they make wars easier to wage implies that "we should raise barriers
to war, to make fighting as brutal as possible").
228.
Anderson & Waxman, supra note 9, at 13 n.41.
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supposed precision inherent in AWS. But at this point in the
development, no one knows whether AWS will be as precise as is
being claimed. While AWS may achieve a high level of precision, it
will take time. Others embracing the moral counter-objection have
made the embellished counterargument that "we should not attempt
to reduce friendly casualties, or improve battlefield medicine, or
conduct any more research that would make victory more likely and
quicker."22 9 Rather, this Article argues as one of its central premises,
and indeed its normative basis, that entering or extending armed
conflict should be more costly based on the political incentives of
decision makers. The counter-objection's premises are different:
namely, trust in the feasibility of AWS technology, 230 belief in the
desirability of the development of AWS technology, and permission
for an accommodating discourse. 231 The debate therefore happens at
two distinct points: the first is concerned with not allowing armed
conflict to be made less costly, and the second is concerned with the
desirability of using technology to the fullest extent possible in order
to gain a military advantage-albeit within the limits of IHL.
VI. CONCLUSION

There is an urgent need to set standards for the deployment of
AWS. In the author's view, they should not be deployed at all until
the deploying country, and by extension the international community,
has satisfied itself that doing so can be done consistent with the
requirements of international humanitarian law. Additionally, the
deploying state needs to confront the ethical and political concerns
and decide whether the potential military gains and some possible
humanitarian benefits of such weapons are worth the adverse
consequences. AWS are receiving a lot of attention lately. 232 The

Lin, Bekey & Abney, supra note 33, at 57.
229.
230.
On the vulnerability of autonomous systems, see Steve Omohundro,
Autonomous Technology and the Greater Human Good, 26 J. EXPERIMENTAL &
THEORETICAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 303, 308-09 (2014) (discussing problems with
software bugs in general, as well as security holes, which other autonomous systems
could exploit).
See Anderson & Waxman, supra note 9, at 7-8 (declaring it a mistake to
231.
take a "wait-and-see" attitude toward the ethical and legal significance of autonomous
robotic weapons). According to the authors, "[t]his is also the time - before ethical and
legal understandings of autonomous weapon systems become hardened in the eyes of
key constituents of the international system - to propose and defend a framework for
evaluating them that advances simultaneously strategic and moral interests." Id. This
idea is commensurate with the authors' approach for addressing AWS that consists of
the "gradual development of internal state norms and best practices that, worked out,
debated, and applied to the United States' own weapons development process, can be
carried outwards to discussions with others around the world." Id. at 16.
Indeed, the discussion surrounding autonomous weapons in the context of
232.
conventional weapons will continue in 2015. See Permanent Rep. of Poland to the U.N.,
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discussion follows a similar (and unfortunate) division that
characterized the debate about the use of drones in targeted killings.
Both opponents and proponents of drone strikes made resolute claims
about their respective positions, sometimes on the basis of insufficient
legal reasoning. They reached conclusions less on the basis of legal
rationales, and more on policy grounds. The initial salvos in the
debate about AWS show a similar tendency. Claims about "killer
robots" clash with similarly absolute claims about systems that are
supposedly the same as existing weapons and opinions that diminish
the challenges posed by AWS. These challenges include the legal,
ethical, and political issues analyzed in Parts III-V of this Article. 2 33
While this debate is ultimately crucial to the legal assessments,
there can be little doubt that the trend is toward increasing
autonomy. With incremental steps toward autonomy, advanced
militaries will very likely have the capability to employ AWS in the
future. Under one narrative, AWS are nothing but a continuation of
existing technology and pose few challenges. 234 Under another more
plausible narrative, AWS could undermine decades of IHL and
human rights development unless care is taken to ensure compliance
with international legal principles through the software on which
these AWS will be based. This will be difficult and potentially
impossible to achieve. What makes such an endeavor especially
problematic is that the applicable law is less determinate than some
would like it to be. Trying to translate highly indeterminate rules into
software has so far proven to be illusory; there has been no realistic
plan to replicate the fundamentally qualitative assessments in a
proportionality analysis of military action.
Similar challenges exist with respect to ethical questions and
policy concerns. Ethical debates are vigorous, and pit those who
adhere to a utilitarian vision against those who emphasize the need
to learn lessons from important historical experiences. There is also
debate about the political challenges; though some AWS proponents

Letter dated Oct. 16, 2014 from the Permanent Rep. of Poland to the United Nations
addressed to the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons (CCW), 2 (Oct. 16, 2014), available at http://www.unog.chl80256EDD006B8954/
(httpAssets)/2F9FE1F4FBC57920C1257D740032E90F/$file/LetterCCWPreparations.pdf
[http://perma.cc/JSG4-2RW9] (archived Nov. 21, 2014) (outlining discussion points for
the 2015 CCW Meeting of the High Contracting Parties).
233.
One major point of division is whether technological advances are capable
of allowing AWS to conform to the existing rules of IHL. It bears mentioning that calls
for new rules appear futile; attempts to create more flexibility concerning the
applicability of the existing IHL rules to AWS may be politically opportune for some
but undermine the universality of legal rules. See supra Part III.A-C.
234.
Cf. Beard, supra note 138, at 620 ("Many of the risks, dangers, and
challenges of future autonomous weapon systems are already present in existing,
widely-deployed systems."); Anderson & Waxman, supra note 9, at 2 (advising the
United States to recognize the "inevitable but incremental evolution of these
technologies," and act to set norms for their use).
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seem to dismiss opposing viewpoints, there are important insights
that can be gleaned from AWS skeptics.
A ban on the further development and future use of AWS,
235
but opposed by
demanded by a number of groups and individuals
236
seems unlikely in light of the dual-use nature of the
others,
technology. Above all, the debate over AWS deserves and requires a
high degree of intellectual honesty and rigor. It is neither helpful to
claim that AWS are unlawful per se when there are at least cogent
arguments that in some circumstances they may withstand legal
scrutiny, nor is it helpful to claim that humans will retain full
2 37
decision-making authority at all times.

A coalition of groups and individuals has formed to work towards a ban on
235.
what it calls "killer robots." CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, http://
www.stopkillerrobots.org/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2014) [http://perma.cc/ZGW5-EAX9]
(archived Sept. 22, 2014). Human Rights Watch's report is instructive for the views
held by this coalition. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 4-5 (requesting
that states ban the use of autonomous weapons, and that roboticists develop a code of
ethical conduct governing the weaponization of their research, on the premise that
such weapons should never be allowed to be outside of human control); see also Peter
Asaro, On Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and the
Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-Making, 94 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 687, 708--09
(2012) ("As a matter of the preservation of human morality, dignity, justice, and law,
we cannot accept an automated system making the decision to take a human life.");
Sharkey, Evitability, supra note 9, at 798-99 (calling for a ban out of skepticism toward
the efficacy of ethical governor software and a belief that the use of deadly force should
never be totally out of human hands).
See, e.g., Hauptman, supra note 28, at 194 (countering concerns that the
236.
use of AWS will diffuse responsibility for military actions and encourage states to toe
the bounds of international law by arguing that this problem merely requires the
enforcement of existing law, not the banning of this technology); Lucas, supra note 216,
at 1274 (arguing that the criteria by which we should judge autonomous systems are
not ethical ones, but rather safety, reliability, and conformity with international law);
Marchant et al., supra note 10, at 314-15 (recommending the development of new
"governance mechanisms" for the use of lethal autonomous robots, ranging from ethical
programming to changing national policies or even the laws of war); Shane R. Reeves &
William J. Johnson, Autonomous Weapons: Are You Sure These are Killer Robots? Can
We Talk About It?, ARMY L. 25, 29-30 (2014) (arguing that the current push to ban
AWS is just as misguided as earlier attempts to ban aerial bombardment, and may
have similar disasterous consequences); Schmitt, Autonomous, supra note 121, at 25
(stating that because they are capable of causing less collateral damage, "the
prohibition of autonomous weapon systems would actually place civilians and civilian
property at greater risk of incidental harm than if the autonomous weapon system had
been available to the attacker"); Anderson & Waxman, supra note 9, at 7-8
(recommending continued debate over potential legal and ethical constraints on AWS,
rather than an outright ban).
Until a few years ago, it was commonplace for defense officials to consider
237.
retaining humans in the loop as an essential component of warfare, even in the future.
See DEP'T OF DEF., UNMANNED SYSTEMS SAFETY GUIDE FOR DoD ACQUISITION 7 (1st ed.

2007) ("In the past, mishaps would ultimately be mitigated by a human operator.
Because [unmanned systems] may not have a human-in-the-loop, they possess unique
safety concerns and issues."). However, a U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) report in
2009 predicted that the technological challenges regarding fully autonomous systems
will be overcome by the middle of the century. U.S. AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE UNMANNED
AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) FLIGHT PLAN 2009-2047 7 (2009) (predicting that the Air Force
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Given the rather large amount of uncertainty surrounding the
ability to create AWS that adhere to IHL rules, all sides would do
well to provide measured analyses. AWS raise questions that lend
themselves to interdisciplinary inquiries-inquiries in which it is
important that the participants engage across ideological lines with
the underlying premises and self-understandings of each other's
disciplines.

will have "[u]nmanned aircraft that are fully integrated with manned aircraft across
the full range of military operations" by 2047).

